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Article 
Reconsidering Fictitious Pricing 
David Adam Friedman† 
  INTRODUCTION   
On Black Friday, 2014, United States Senator Richard 
Blumenthal stood in front of a prominent regional retail outlet 
mall1 to “look at some of the merchandise and see what shop-
pers [were] doing.”2 Earlier that day, Senator Blumenthal ex-
pressed concern “that some outlet store bargains featuring al-
legedly reduced prices on brand name products may actually be 
selling goods of lesser quality using deceptive pricing.”3 The 
Senator, invoking a “where there’s smoke, there’s fire” argu-
ment, remarked that eleven class action lawsuits had been filed 
nationally involving deceptive-pricing practices at retail outlet 
stores.4 His public demonstration echoed a letter he and three 
other members of Congress had sent to the chairwoman of the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), urging enforcement action 
against outlet stores engaging in deceptive pricing, including 
 
 † Associate Professor of Law, Willamette University. B.A., Yale College; 
J.D., Yale Law School. Thank you to Laura Appleman, Curtis Bridgeman, Jim 
Hawkins, Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Michael Mannheimer, Peter Molk, Jeffrey 
Standen, Ahmed Taha, and Spencer Weber Waller for extensive comments. 
The faculties of Northern Kentucky Chase College of Law and the Willamette 
University College of Law also offered insights and suggestions, as did partici-
pants at the 2015 International Contracts Conference at UNLV Boyd School of 
Law. Librarian Mary Rumsey provided valuable support. Copyright © 2016 by 
David Adam Friedman. 
 1. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) defines “outlet stores” as “retail 
stores, shops and other establishments in which manufacturers sell their stock 
and other merchandise directly to the public through factory-direct-to-
consumer branded store locations at discounted prices, and which are often 
used by manufacturers to liquidate stock.” Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 151 F.T.C. 
23, 36 (2011). 
 2. Gregory B. Hladky, Blumenthal Warns Holiday Shoppers About Out-
lets Using Deceptive Pricing, Advertising, HARTFORD COURANT (Nov. 
28, 2014), http://www.courant.com/politics/hc-blumenthal-outlet-shop-warning 
-20141128-story.html. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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representing current prices as discounts from a fictitious regu-
lar price.5 This letter marked the highest profile federal-level 
call to address fictitious-pricing practices in decades. The FTC, 
after decades of frequent enforcement, ceased prosecution of 
fictitious-pricing actions in 1969.6 
Beyond congressional letters and press events, the acceler-
ation of deceptive discount pricing practices has drawn cri-
tiques from other quarters. Referring to advertised discounts as 
“silliness,” a former senior Sears executive confessed to the 
Wall Street Journal, that “the original price from which [a re-
tail-price] discount is computed is often specious . . . because 
items hardly ever sell at that price, which makes the discount 
less legitimate.”7 
This Article uses “fictitious pricing” to describe this com-
mon advertising tactic frowned upon by the FTC Guides. Ad-
vertisers offer discounts based off a prior-reference price. An 
item advertised for sale at $80 at “20% off” presumably was of-
fered for sale in good faith at a reference price of $100. If the 
advertiser never offered the good at $100, the prior-reference 
price was “fictitious,” rendering the entirety of the price presen-
tation “fictitious.” The FTC Guides advise sellers that “[i]f . . . 
the former price being advertised is not bona fide but ficti-
tious—for example, where an artificial, inflated price was es-
tablished for the purpose of enabling the subsequent offer of a 
large reduction—the ‘bargain’ being advertised is . . . false.”8 
 
 5. See Letter from Sheldon Whitehouse, U.S. Senator, et al. to Edith 
Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www 
.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/sens-and-rep-to-ftc-outlet-stores-may-be 
-misleading-consumers. The FTC declined the invitation to investigate the al-
legations because it had not “received enough consumer complaints.” Hladky, 
supra note 2. Blumenthal deemed this a “ridiculous, ludicrous reason,” be-
cause “the FTC has no particular threshold number of consumer complaints 
necessary to trigger a probe.” Id. Also, an individual consumer may have diffi-
culty detecting harm through the fog of the deceptive scheme. 
 6. The last standalone FTC mention of “fictitious” pricing appeared in an 
order on December 31, 1970, a follow-through of a holdover complaint filed in 
1969. See Hollywood Credit Clothing Co., 77 F.T.C. 1594, 1604–05 (1970). In 
1969, the FTC confronted high-profile, broad, and blunt critiques that through 
“bureaucratic inertia” and “lethargy,” the agency had an unfortunate tradition 
of wasting resources on “trivial pursuits.” Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC and 
New Paternalism, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 323, 343–44, 349 (2008); see also William 
MacLeod et al., Three Rules and a Constitution: Consumer Protection Finds Its 
Limits in Competition Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 943, 943 (2005). 
 7. Suzanne Kapner, The Dirty Secret of Black Friday “Discounts,” WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023042810 
04579217863262940166. 
 8. 16 C.F.R. § 233.1 (2014) (emphasis added). 
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As a marketing practice, discount advertising, bona fide 
and fictitious, has proliferated recently.9 Discounting has in-
creased in frequency and in degree. According to one analysis, 
from 2009 to 2012, the number of discount offers increased six-
ty-three percent.10 Over the same time period, the average dis-
count offered moved from twenty-five percent to thirty-six per-
cent.11 Given the increased frequency of overall discounting, 
does fictitious pricing warrant concern? Does fictitious pricing 
inflict harm? 
An individual or collective remedy may be challenging to 
frame for consumers claiming that false prior-reference prices 
induced their transaction. However, “a large body of evidence 
show[s] that the presence of a reference price increases con-
sumers’ deal valuations and purchase intentions and can lower 
their search intentions . . . .”12 Writ large, this type of practice 
has a broad effect on the integrity of competition in retail mar-
kets and consumer welfare, which regulators should address. 
Basic behavioral economics amplifies the effect of fictitious 
pricing because the tactic can induce transactions by enhancing 
the perceived value of a transaction. For welfare reasons, de-
ceptive-pricing practices deserve renewed scrutiny. 
Though a dormant area for public federal enforcement 
since 1969,13 private litigants recently have invoked fictitious 
 
 9. See Larry D. Compeau et al., Comparative Price Advertising: Believe It 
or Not, 36 J. CONSUMER AFF. 284, 284 (2002) (“Advertisers’ attempts to en-
hance consumers’ perceptions of the value of a deal by using comparative price 
advertisements, in which they . . . compare the selling price to some suggested 
reference price, is widespread . . . . [A] crucial issue concerns the deceptive 
power of comparative price advertising that provides inflated and exaggerated 
reference prices.”). 
 10. Kapner, supra note 7 (describing tracking of discount practices at thir-
ty-one retailers). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Gorkan Ahmetoglu et al., Pricing Practices: A Critical Review of Their 
Effects on Consumers, 21 J. RETAILING & CONSUMER SERVS. 696, 699 (2014); 
see, e.g., Dhruv Grewal & Larry D. Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising: 
Informative or Deceptive?, 11 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 52, 55–58 (1992) 
[hereinafter Grewal & Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising] (containing a 
meta-analysis cited by the Ninth Circuit in Hinojos and serving as a “credible 
basis” for Professor Compeau’s testimony in the Overstock.com litigation). A 
more recent analysis also supported findings that fictitious pricing negatively 
affects welfare. See Mark Armstrong & Yongmin Chen, Discount Pricing 25–
26 (Univ. of Oxford, Dep’t of Econ., Discussion Paper Series No. 605, 2012), 
http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/5819/paper605.pdf. 
 13. See discussion supra note 6; see also Carleton A. Harkrader, Fictitious 
Pricing and the FTC: A New Look at an Old Dodge, 37 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 3–
4 (1962) (noting that fictitious pricing actions emerged as the “leading type of 
deception practiced in violation of the FTC Act”). 
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pricing claims with mixed results—in part because harm 
proves difficult for private litigants to allege.14 A recent spate of 
private class actions involving retail-outlet fictitious pricing,15 if 
successful, may resurrect scrutiny of this suspect advertising 
practice. Some states have sporadically filled the federal en-
forcement vacuum,16 bringing different statutory standards,17 
 
 14. For a typical result favoring the advertiser, see Kim v. Carter’s, Inc., 
598 F.3d 362, 365–66 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that there was no identifiable 
pecuniary harm to the consumer if an item was sold at a discount from a ficti-
tious price because the actual price charged at the point-of-sale served as the 
contractual price); see also B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 258 
F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming judgment where a small retailer failed to 
prove that a competitor’s fictitious pricing caused harm); Johnson v. Jos. A. 
Bank Clothiers, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-756, 2014 WL 4129576 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 19, 
2014) (dismissing class action claims for failure to allege actual damages); 
Camasta v. Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-08285, 2013 WL 4495661 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2013) (dismissing a claim brought under Illinois Consumer 
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act); Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothi-
ers, Inc., No. 12 C 7782, 2013 WL 3866507 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2013) (dismissing 
a consumer complaint for failure to allege actual damages); Mulligan v. QVC, 
Inc., 888 N.E.2d 1190 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (granting summary judgment to a 
retailer when a consumer failed to establish damages). For an atypical result 
favoring the consumer, see Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1105 (9th 
Cir. 2013) where the plaintiff consumer successfully  
allege[s] an economic injury under [California statutes]. [He alleges] 
that the advertised discounts conveyed false information about the 
goods he purchased, i.e., that the goods he purchased sold at a sub-
stantially higher price at [the retailer] in the recent past and/or in the 
prevailing market. He also alleges that he would not have purchased 
the goods in question absent this misrepresentation.  
This was deemed sufficient for the plaintiff to proceed. 
 15. As of December 2014, at least eleven private civil complaints about 
fictitious pricing in retail outlet stores had been filed. See, e.g., Complaint, Ru-
benstein v. Neiman Marcus Grp. L.L.C., No. CV 14-07155 SJO (JPRx) (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 2, 2015), 2015 WL 1841254; Complaint, Branca v. Nordstrom, Inc., 
No. 3:14-cv-2062 MMA JMA (S.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2014), 2014 WL 4313226; First 
Amended Complaint, Gattinella v. Michael Kors (USA), Inc., No. 1:14-cv-5731 
(WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014). It does appear that some of these cases were 
brought by the same law firm in a coordinated manner. 
 16. See, e.g., People v. Overstock.com, Inc., No. RG10-546833, 2014 WL 
657516 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2014) (finding Overstock.com in violation of 
California Fair Advertising Law); Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to 
New York Executive Law § 63(15), In re Michaels Stores, Inc. (2011) [hereinaf-
ter Assurance of Discontinuance, Michaels] (on file with author) (consent de-
cree between New York Attorney General and Michaels Stores concerning mis-
leading sales promotions); Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to New York 
Executive Law § 63(15), In re Jos. A Bank Clothiers, Inc. (2004) [hereinafter 
Assurance of Discontinuance, Jos. A. Bank], http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/  
default/files/press-releases/archived/sep14a_04_attach1.pdf (consent decree 
between retailer and the New York Attorney General that includes a mandate 
for the retailer to comply with the FTC Guides on Prior-Reference Pricing). 
 17. See generally Robert Pitofsky et al., Pricing Laws Are No Bargain for 
Consumers, 18 ANTITRUST 62, 64 (2004) [hereinafter Pitofsky, Pricing Laws] 
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complicating compliance for national retailers.18 If these private 
and state actions prove unsuccessful and yield uneven results, 
the FTC should consider, in measured form, resurrecting en-
forcement of fictitious pricing in a manner that directly ad-
dresses welfare harm from the practice. 
The FTC discontinued enforcement of fictitious pricing be-
cause, as Robert Pitofsky19 explained in 1977, the Commission 
determined that discount retailers needed to be nurtured to 
foster price competition.20 Regulatory intervention, Pitofsky ar-
gued, would dampen the aggression of these rising retailers. 
Today’s retail marketplace, however, presents a vastly changed 
landscape that compels reconsideration of enforcement.  
Public intervention would be required to dampen fictitious 
pricing, given that private civil actions and piecemeal state ac-
tions have not effectively addressed this growing phenomenon. 
In Part I, this Article describes and adopts the FTC’s definition 
of fictitious pricing. This Article further explains, using basic 
tenets of behavioral economics, why discount pricing proves ef-
fective, which further informs why fictitious pricing warrants 
extra scrutiny. In Part II, this Article describes the challenge of 
conceptualizing individual harm and fashioning appropriate di-
rect remedies for consumers. Recent private litigation under Il-
linois and California law illustrates these challenges. Part III 
presents evidence of a broader, negative welfare impact from 
fictitious pricing, justifying a degree of regulatory intervention. 
This Article explores the literature supporting this conclusion. 
This Article further argues that the courses recently taken in 
California and New York mirror a sensible analytical frame-
work for regulators. In Part IV, this Article prescribes explor-
ing targeted federal regulatory intervention to dampen ficti-
tious-pricing practices, after a nearly fifty-year hiatus. The 
FTC should start by regulating in narrower spheres where re-
tailers emphasize discounts of high-quality brands, or heavily 
market their sales channels as discount-focused. Federal regu-
lation would proactively enable retailers to enjoy the uniformi-
 
(describing the practical difficulties created by varying state laws). 
 18. See generally id. at 63–64. 
 19. Pitofsky has been described as a “Founding Father” of the “modern 
Federal Trade Commission.” Timothy Muris, Robert Pitofsky: Public Servant 
and Scholar, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 25, 25 (2001). 
 20. Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regula-
tion of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 687–88 (1977) [hereinafter Pitofsky, 
Beyond Nader]. In a shorter piece in 2004, Pitofsky reiterated similar concerns 
about enforcing fictitious pricing. See Pitofsky, Pricing Laws, supra note 17, at 
62. 
926 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:921 
 
ty that state enforcement will not offer.21 
I.  FICTITIOUS PRICING AND THE POWER OF DISCOUNT 
ADVERTISING   
In early years, the FTC prosecuted fictitious-pricing ac-
tions without any guidance to sellers about how to comply with 
standards for pricing. In 1958, the FTC first brought form to 
the boundaries of lawful prior-reference pricing through the 
promulgation of the Guides Against Deceptive Pricing.22 The 
FTC relaxed the Guides in 1964,23 and in 1967 it shaped them 
into their current form.24 Until 1969, FTC fictitious-pricing ac-
tions were fairly common.25 After a major overhaul of the FTC 
and the Commission’s priorities in the early Nixon Administra-
tion,26 federal public enforcement stopped completely, and this 
posture holds today.27 Moving to the present, in December of 
 
 21. See generally Pitofsky, Pricing Laws, supra note 17, at 63–64. (advo-
cating for the eradication of state regulation). 
 22. Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, 23 Fed. Reg. 7965 (Oct. 15, 1958). 
 23. 16 C.F.R. § 14.10(a)(2) (1966) (adopted Jan. 8, 1964). 
 24. 16 C.F.R. § 233.1(a) (2015); 32 Fed. Reg. 15534–36 (Nov. 8, 1967). This 
version of the Guides enjoyed a short shelf life for FTC usage, given subse-
quent non-enforcement. 
 25. Right until the drastic changes of 1969, the FTC continued to pursue 
enforcement vigorously and with a measure of institutional pride. In the 1968 
FTC Annual Report, the FTC prominently mentioned fictitious pricing: “In 
addition to . . . complaint[s] received by mail, 570,142 . . . advertisements were 
monitored . . . to determine how best they could be corrected. The diversity 
was legion but among the favorites were . . . . fictitious pricing of countless 
products.” FTC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 8 
(1968). 
 26. Edward F. Cox, Reinvigorating the FTC: The Nader Report and the 
Rise of Consumer Advocacy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 899, 900–01 (2005). Cox, the 
author of the article, was a “Raider.” Id. at 899; see also ABA, REPORT OF THE 
ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 86, 95 (1969) 
[hereinafter 1969 ABA REPORT] (criticizing the direction of the FTC prior to 
1969); RICHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULATO-
RY CHANGE 165 (2d ed. 1996) (describing changes to the FTC in the late 
1960s); JUSTIN MARTIN, NADER: CRUSADER, SPOILER, ICON 81 (2002) (“Nader’s 
FTC raid really did accomplish something; his seven children really did man-
age to lead the adults. In 1969 Richard Nixon, newly elected as president, 
asked the American Bar Association to conduct an independent investigation 
of the FTC. [The ABA’s conclusions were] remarkably similar to the conclu-
sions of Nader’s Raiders . . . .”); Letter from President Richard Nixon to Wil-
liam T. Gossett, President, Am. Bar Ass’n (Apr. 18, 1969). 
 27. See discussion supra note 6. In 1980, all four instances of “fictitious 
pricing” behavior referenced in FTC consent judgments were accompanied by 
primary charges of related deceptive practices, like bait-and-switch, or false 
energy-saving claims. FTC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION 26–27 (1980). After 1980, all mentions of “fictitious pricing” completely 
disappeared from the FTC Reporter. 
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2014 the New York Times presented findings28 from the shop-
ping-advocacy websites The Wirecutter29 and Sweethome30 that 
less than one percent of 54,000 “holiday deals,” were “worth 
your time.”31 Not all of these deals were deemed “bad deals” due 
to improper discounting. However, the website researchers sin-
gled out as “one of the most common holiday gimmicks,” the 
presentation of an item as discounted from a prior “suggested 
price”—a price that does not reflect a “normal sales price.”32  
As an example of “improper discounting,” the editor of the 
websites cited an online deal offered by Macy’s for a toaster ov-
en.33 Macy’s priced the toaster oven at $252, presenting it as a 
discount off a special sale price of $280, a reduction compound-
ed by an additional ten percent offer-code discount, ultimately 
reflecting an advertised regular price of $417.34 Amazon and 
Best Buy advertised this very same toaster at a straight-up 
price of $250 for several months but without a reference price 
that would have reflected the “discounts” listed by Macy’s.35 If 
$417 truly reflected the Macy’s bona-fide price offering at one 
time in the past, the advertised discount would be powerful but 
not fictitious.36  
Why would a retailer signal a price discount off of such a 
questionable calculation? Among other reasons, perhaps to ex-
ploit consumer behavioral tendencies by presenting a pricing 
“anchor” to shoppers that signals that the item has high value 
and that the consumer is getting a bargain. Some consumers 
will take the discount as a signal to stop shopping, even though 
 
 28. Farhad Manjoo, Online Deals for Holiday Shopping: Buyer Beware, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2014, at B1; see also Lydia DePillis, Holiday Sales Are a 
Dirty Lie, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/wonkblog/wp/2013/11/26/holiday-sales-are-a-dirty-lie (describing Black 
Friday “doorbuster” discount sales as an “elaborate con”). 
 29. WIRECUTTER, http://wirecutter.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).  
 30. SWEETHOME, http://sweethome.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2015). 
 31. Manjoo, supra note 28. The editors of the sites dedicate twenty full-
time writers to investigate retail deals during the holiday season. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Macy’s defended this advertised markdown practice with a series of 
non-sequiturs, noting that:  
advertised ‘regular’ prices are ‘based on many different factors, in-
cluding the cost of the item, overhead, benefits we offer . . . as well as 
our ability to offer the item at a lower price during sale events’ and 
further, that Macy’s had expressly disclaimed the representation that 
any sales had been made at $417.  
Id. 
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in the case of Macy’s they could have saved a few dollars had 
they continued. Consumers who bought from Macy’s before 
finding the lowest price paid almost a one-percent premium 
over a purchase from a competitor. More significant, perhaps, 
Macy’s would take a sale away from an honest competitor at a 
gross margin likely above thirty percent, a compelling motive to 
employ this advertising tactic.37 
In Section A, this Article moves from the above Macy’s an-
ecdote toward a formal definition of fictitious pricing. For the 
purposes of this Article, the definition of fictitious prior-
reference pricing offered by the FTC and flesh out its bounda-
ries by exploring a hypothetical retail scenario. Having estab-
lished the definition of fictitious pricing, in Section B, this 
Article explains the behavioral economics that make discount 
advertising powerful, with the notion that extra scrutiny of dis-
count pricing is warranted because of the potential for manipu-
lation of consumer biases. 
A. FICTITIOUS PRICING DEFINED 
This Article uses “fictitious pricing” and “deceptive pricing” 
interchangeably with “false prior-reference pricing.” Broadly, 
“deceptive pricing,” as defined by the FTC Guides, encompasses 
a related range of pricing tactics,38 from fictitious former-price 
comparisons,39 to false retail-price comparisons,40 misleading 
use of a manufacturer’s suggested price,41 and bargains based 
on the purchase of other articles.42 
 
 37. Cf. Macy’s Gross Profit Margin (Quarterly), YCHARTS, https://ycharts 
.com/companies/M/gross_profit_margin (last visited Nov. 24, 2015) (indicating 
that Macy’s gross profit margin has been over 30% for the past five years). 
 38. 16 C.F.R. § 233 (2014). 
 39. Id. § 233.1(a) (“[W]here an artificial, inflated price was established [by 
the advertiser] for the purpose of enabling the subsequent offer of a large re-
duction—the ‘bargain’ being advertised is a false one . . . .”).  
 40. Id. § 233.2(a) (“[A]dvertising . . . pric[ing as being] lower than those 
being charged by others for the same merchandise in the advertiser’s trade 
area . . . may be done . . . but . . . the advertised higher price must . . . not be 
fictitious or misleading.”). 
 41. Id. § 233.3(a) (“[If] suggested retail prices do not in fact correspond to 
prices at which a substantial number of sales of the article in question are 
made, the advertisement of a reduction [from the suggested retail price] may 
mislead the consumer.”).  
 42. Id. § 233.4(a) (“Frequently, advertisers choose to offer bargains in the 
form of additional merchandise to be given a customer on the condition that he 
purchase a particular article at the price usually offered by the advertiser. . . . 
Representative of the language frequently employed in such offers are ‘Free,’ 
‘Buy One—Get One Free,’ ‘2-For-1 Sale,’ ‘Half Price Sale,’ ‘1¢ Sale,’ ‘50% Off,’ 
etc. . . . . It is important . . . that where such a form of offer is used, care be 
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The FTC guidance on fictitious pricing reflects a considera-
tion of the useful functions of honest discount pricing. Dis-
count-pricing advertising, if truthful in presenting the former 
price, benefits both buyers and sellers. Express presentation of 
the former price as a reference point provides consumers valu-
able information. The seller signals that a “bargain” opportuni-
ty, a departure from “regular” pricing, exists. Such a deal will 
likely draw more attention from consumers than items that 
hold to a “regular” price. Sellers can benefit by moving previ-
ously overpriced (or mispriced) inventory, and more buyers will 
enter the market to purchase at the lower price, especially 
when informed about the special nature of the low price. Com-
petitors may, in turn, respond to discounts with more price 
cuts, which benefit consumers. 
However, if the advertised former reference price is ex-
pressly or implicitly a false representation, meaning that the 
method for selling the good involved luring consumers by rep-
resenting something untrue, then the advertised price is ficti-
tious. The effects of fictitious pricing can be unduly distortive. 
The FTC, in the past, regulated prior-reference discounting be-
havior through enforcement43 of Section 5 of the FTC Act, which 
declares unlawful “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”44 The 
FTC provides sellers with more detailed “Guides” on a range of 
market behaviors, including deceptive pricing.45 FTC Guides do 
not have the force of law, but they “provide the basis for volun-
tary and simultaneous abandonment of unlawful practices by 
members of industry. Failure to comply with the guides may 
result in corrective action by the Commission under applicable 
statutory provisions.”46 The FTC situated guidance on fictitious 
 
taken not to mislead the consumer.”).  
 43. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)–(c) (2012) (describing the FTC’s enforcement au-
thority). 
 44. Id. § 45(a). Though advertising practices can be regulated either 
through “unfairness” or “deception,” the FTC has prosecuted most advertising 
cases through the “deception” standard. The deception standard differs from 
the unfairness standard, and both standards evolved separately. See JOHN A. 
SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 67 (3d ed. 2007); see 
also DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND 
THE LAW § 11:1 (2015). 
 45. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 233.1.  
 46. 16 C.F.R. § 1.5 (2014) (emphasis added). The FTC has long held that 
the Guides must be subject to consistent interpretation. Crown Publishers 
Inc., 66 F.T.C. 1488, 1496 (1964) (“[W]ords and phrases of the type set out in 
the ‘Guides’ must be consistently dealt with by the Commission or its decisions 
will have no meaning or value. Only by consistent interpretation can some or-
der be brought to the semantic jungle of advertising.” (quoting Gimbel Bros. 
Inc., 61 F.T.C. 1051, 1073 (1962))). Gimbel Bros. “practically gives the Guides 
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pricing within the guidance on deceptive pricing.47 Though ficti-
tious pricing encompasses practices broader than former-price 
comparisons, such as competitor comparisons, this Article fo-
cuses on fictitious pricing in the former price-comparison con-
text. 
1. FTC Guide on Former Price Comparisons 
The FTC Guide on Former Price Comparisons describes 
what constitutes deception48 when a seller offers an article at a 
price that expressly references a prior price by that seller.49 The 
Guide first defines a “true bargain”: 
If the former price is the actual, bona fide price at which the article 
was offered to the public on a regular basis for a reasonably substan-
tial period of time, it provides a legitimate basis for the advertising of 
a price comparison. Where the former price is genuine, the bargain 
being advertised is a true one.50 
Then, the FTC informs sellers where discount-pricing tac-
tics cross over into dishonest and deceptive territory: 
If . . . the former price being advertised is not bona fide but ficti-
tious—for example, where an artificial, inflated price was established 
for the purpose of enabling the subsequent offer of a large reduction—
the “bargain” being advertised is a false one; the purchaser is not re-
ceiving the unusual value he expects. In such a case, the “reduced” 
price is, in reality, probably just the seller’s regular price.51 
 Examples of deceptive prior-reference price discounting of-
fered by the Guide include a scenario where a seller tests a 
higher price point for an article for “only a few days,” and then, 
after the test fails, lowers the price back to the regular price, 
labeling it as a discount. This discount is “not genuine.”52 The 
Guide further points to practices where the seller “might use a 
price at which he never offered the article at all,” or one “not 
used in the regular course of business . . . [nor] used in the re-
cent past but at some remote period in the past, without mak-
ing disclosure of that fact.”53 A “non-genuine” bargain “might 
 
the force of a legal presumption.” Ira M. Millstein, The Federal Trade Com-
mission and False Advertising, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 439, 472 n.165 (1964); see 
also Matthew A. Edwards, The Law, Marketing and Behavioral Economics of 
Consumer Rebates, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 362, 397 (2007) (describing the 
FTC’s approach to enforcing Section 5 and guiding commercial actors). 
 47. 16 C.F.R. § 233. 
 48. More precisely, what the FTC warned sellers could constitute decep-
tion, potentially triggering an action. 
 49. 16 C.F.R. § 233.1. 
 50. Id. § 233.1(a). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. § 233.1(c). 
 53. Id. § 233.1(d). 
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use a price that was not openly offered to the public” or one 
that was offered but was immediately reduced after an unrea-
sonable period of time.54 Note that the current Guide does not 
require proof of actual sales of the article at the reference price 
in order to establish the reference price, but the original 1958 
Guide did.55 The current Guide lowered the bar for seller behav-
ior; sellers merely have to prove that the article was offered at 
the prior price in good faith. 
The Guide also advises sellers to take caution whenever 
accompanying price terms with words like “Regularly,” “Usual-
ly,” and “Formerly.”56 Even the plain use of the word “Sale,” ac-
cording to the Guide, should cause the advertiser to “take care 
that the amount of reduction is not so insignificant as to be 
meaningless. It should be sufficiently large that the consumer, 
if he knew what it was, would believe that a genuine bargain or 
saving was being offered.”57  
The Guide effectively provided retailers a rulebook—a qua-
si-safe harbor—useful in the era when the FTC pursued en-
forcement. Pricing tactics that have emerged as the modern re-
tail norm regularly cross the Guide’s boundaries of lawful 
behavior. Applying the Guide’s standards to a real example 
from the market illustrates this point.  
2. Illustrative Application of Guide 
For context about the complexity of regulating pricing 
strategies, consider this actual example of how a major retailer 
marked and priced sweaters: 
A supplier sells the sweater to a retailer for roughly $14.50. The sug-
gested retail price is $50, which gives the retailer a roughly 70% 
markup. A few sweaters sell at that price, but more sell at the first 
markdown of $44.99, and the bulk sell at the final discount price of 
$21.99 [advertised over fifty-percent off]. That produces an average 
unit retail price of $28 and gives the store about a 45% gross margin 
on the product.59 
How would the Guide apply to this factual scenario? If the 
original price of $49.99 constituted the “actual, bona fide 
price . . . offered to the public on a regular basis for a reasona-
 
 54. Id. 
 55. See infra Part I.C. 
 56. 16 C.F.R. § 233.1(e). 
 57. Id. The Guides clarify: “An advertiser who claims that an item has 
been ‘Reduced to $9.99,’ when the former price was $10, is misleading the con-
sumer, who will understand the claim to mean that a much greater, and not 
merely nominal, reduction was being offered.” Id. 
 59. See Kapner, supra note 7 (discussing an example provided by a retail 
industry consultant). 
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bly substantial period of time,” the advertised former price 
would be “genuine,” the comparison basis “legitimate,” and the 
bargain, “true.”60 By the Guide’s criteria, the duration of the 
$50 offer is material. The Guide advises that the duration of 
“only a few days” would not suffice, but a longer time lays 
foundation for offering the price on a “regular basis” or a “sub-
stantial period of time.”61 
Complicating the matter, however, the Guide indicates 
that discounting tactics cross the line when “the purchaser 
[does] not receiv[e] the unusual value he expects.”62 Given the 
prevalence of discounting practices, a purchaser may have, es-
pecially after decades without federal enforcement, a low 
threshold for the “value he expects.” In an environment of om-
nipresent discounting, consumers may have skewed percep-
tions of value. Though it is hard to imagine that an enforce-
ment-focused FTC would allow the deceptive behavior to negate 
the rule by defining the norm downward, it is possible that pol-
icymakers are not frothing to intervene because consumers 
have no expectation of honest pricing.63 The problem may be 
that when consumers get a perceived bargain, they do not look 
back at the pricing history of an item to see if they were misled. 
Such a deception might be difficult to detect—and personal 
post-purchase research would be costly. 
The above sweater marketing practice likely constitutes 
lawful price discrimination. Urgent buyers who wish to pay the 
higher price will do so sooner, while the less urgent will value 
the offering at a lower point. They will transact later at a lower 
price, perhaps as the “sweater season” passes. Advertising the 
price in conjunction with a prior-reference price point might 
seize the attention of bargain hunters, with whom the seller 
would never transact, had the offer been at $28 the entire time, 
(or perhaps even at $21.99).64 Most important, for the purpose 
of deceptive pricing, the initial sweater price would constitute a 
 
 60. See 16 C.F.R. § 233.1(a). 
 61. Id. § 233.1(a), (c). 
 62. Id. § 233.1(a). 
 63. This absence of expectation, combined with the difficulty for consum-
ers to obtain information to identify fictitious pricing, may in part explain the 
low amount of complaints received by the FTC about retail outlet shopping. In 
fact, the FTC’s response to Senator Blumenthal “for not launching an investi-
gation” into retail outlet fictitious pricing was that “they [had not] received 
enough consumer complaints about [the] issue.” Hladky, supra note 2. The 
Senator labeled this response “ridiculous” and “ludicrous” because the FTC 
has no set number of complaints required for initiating an investigation. Id. 
 64. See Armstrong & Chen, supra note 12, at 25. 
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bona fide offer. Expectations of value would not be unduly ma-
nipulated and consumer search would retain integrity. 
By using the reference point to establish a value baseline, 
the retailer may be manipulating the consumer into a pur-
chase, further exploiting the built-in behavioral biases that this 
Article discusses in Part I.B. This manipulation might cause 
consumers to overestimate product value, purchase something 
that they might not have otherwise purchased, spend more on 
an item than they might have, or even prematurely stop their 
shopping before they found their best bargain.65  
Is the consumer truly harmed by offers referencing ficti-
tious former prices, considering that the retailer ultimately of-
fers the items at a definitive numeric price at the point of sale 
and in the end, the consumer accepts the price? As this Article 
discusses throughout, factors countervail, but in the end, over-
whelming evidence exists that fictitious pricing reduces wel-
fare. A starting point for assessment of fictitious-pricing en-
forcement begins with locating what makes the practice 
powerful for advertisers, informed by basic behavioral econom-
ics. 
B. BEHAVIORAL INFLUENCE ON CONSUMERS 
“I don’t even get excited unless it’s 40% off.”  
- Lourdes Torres, browsing the sales rack at Macy’s.66 
1. Anchoring Effects  
“Anchoring” describes the human tendency to cast dispro-
portionate weight on the first piece of information that they re-
ceive when making subsequent decisions.67 In this context, the 
prior-reference price could be the first piece of information that 
sets the course for subsequent transactional decisions. This 
phenomenon might explain the import of “40%” to the afore-
mentioned Ms. Torres. 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky famously demon-
strated that decision makers “evaluate outcomes” based on “ini-
tial reference point[s].”68 The anchoring of the sale price to a 
 
 65. See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 887–88 (Cal. 
2011). 
 66. Kapner, supra note 7. 
 67. Program on Negotiation, Anchoring Effect, HARV. L. SCH., http://www 
.pon.harvard.edu/tag/anchoring-effect (last visited Nov. 24, 2015). 
 68. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1535 (1998); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Pro-
spect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 
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“former price” makes the sale price more attractive than the 
price would have been had it stood alone. Behavioral economist 
Richard Thaler elaborated that if a “suggested reference price” 
is offered, “a lower selling price will provide positive transac-
tion utility.”69 A higher fictitious “former price” disingenuously 
causes the consumer to attach a higher level of value to an item 
than it would have had the pricing been honest.70 
One meta-analysis of the power of anchoring in deceptive 
prior-reference pricing concluded: 
[A]n abundance of evidence . . . show[s] that advertised reference 
prices (ARPs) influence a range of consumer price-related responses, 
including increasing perceptions of the fair price, the normal price, 
the lowest available price in the market, the potential savings and the 
purchase value . . . . The effects of reference pricing on consumer deal 
evaluations and behaviour have been replicated fairly consistent-
ly . . . .71 
Retailers can use discounting—genuine or fictitious—
powerfully to their advantage if they execute with precision. As 
this Article discusses next, a high prior-reference price can ma-
nipulate transactions by signaling that an offer brings higher 
value but at a lower price. 
2. Price Effect on Perceived Quality 
Consumers may also use a former reference price as a sig-
nal of quality, especially in markets where quality may prove 
difficult to discern.72 If the price signal is genuine—i.e., the 
good was once offered in a bona fide manner at a higher price, 
the advertised discount communicates the availability of a true 
bargain. Perhaps the benefit of waiting for seasonal clothing or 
sporting goods to fade out of season, or the impending introduc-
 
(1979) (critiquing expected utility theory as descriptive model of decision-
making and promoting prospect theory instead).  
 69. Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 27 
MARKETING SCI. 15, 24 (2008). 
 70. See Grewal & Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising, supra note 
12, at 55. 
 71. Ahmetoglu et al., supra note 12; see also Donald R. Lichtenstein, Price 
Perceptions, Merchant Incentives, and Consumer Welfare, 14 J. PROD. & 
BRAND MGMT. 357, 358 (2005) (“ARPs work, a lot of research shows they do, 
and retailer practice and returns shows that they do. This is nothing new—it 
is widely known. If I advertise a sale price of, say, $29.95 and accompany it 
with an ARP of, say $39.95, in most contexts, sales will increase relative to a 
no ARP present situation. Sales will likely increase as I increase my ARP to 
$49.95, to 59.95, to 69.95.”).  
 72. See generally Kyle Bagwell & Michael H. Riordan, High and Declining 
Prices Signal Product Quality, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 224 (1991) (discussing sig-
naling distortion’s relation to pricing). 
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tion of a new model of an electronics item can be realized 
through a discount. If the signal proves false, however, the con-
sumer transacts on a false association of quality. If the adver-
tiser never offered a sweater for a bona fide price of $100, the 
consumer may be left with the impression that the sweater was 
once tagged with $100 quality, and a moderate discount may 
trigger the false notion that the seller is offering extra value.73 
In that scenario, a consumer purchase would be a mismatch of 
payment and expected value, but it might be difficult for the 
consumer to feel a loss without knowing that more shopping 
could have yielded a better deal. 
One well-known analysis describes how consumers link 
price and quality in the context of the rollout of a new product: 
Consider a market in which a firm introduces a new product pos-
sessing some innovative feature of uncertain quality. Some consumers 
can ascertain the quality, while others cannot, but all understand 
that a higher-quality product is more costly to produce. The most effi-
cient way for the firm to signal high quality is to charge a price too 
high to be profitable if the product were in fact of lower quali-
ty . . . . [U]ninformed consumers rationally infer higher quality from 
the higher price.74 
This stylized analysis benefits from a few extensions. The 
scenario fits best with new products but also fits with estab-
lished product lines where consumers have difficulty discerning 
quality and associated price values. Some offerings must be 
evaluated post-purchase in order for consumers to judge quali-
ty.  
In addition to exploiting the anchoring effect and perceived 
quality, fictitious pricing also enables retailers to exploit con-
sumer tendencies and biases in the valuation of bundles of 
gains and losses. This Article further elaborates on that point 
in its discussion of prospect theory. 
3. Prospect Theory 
The presentation of a discount price can lead consumers to 
believe that they are receiving extra value because of the way 
people cognitively assess gains and losses—especially when 
gains are segregated and losses are bundled. At the core of pro-
spect theory, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky demon-
strate that for individuals, losses loom larger than gains of 
 
 73. See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 12 (4th 
ed. 2001) (discussing the “Drubek” anecdote, which describes a mistake but 
invokes similar consumer psychology). 
 74. Id. at 224–25. 
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equivalent magnitude.75 When losses are presented as a bundle, 
however, the perceived total loss diminishes. Conversely, when 
gains are segregated, the perception emerges on net that total 
value is higher.76 The classic illustration of this phenomenon 
comes from an example provided by Richard Thaler, involving a 
lottery experiment. Subjects who win a lottery twice, (once for 
$50, once for $25) tend to enjoy more satisfaction than those 
who win the lottery once for $75.77 
How does discounting tap into prospect theory? A discount 
offers the buyer segregated gains and a consolidated loss, en-
hancing the perceived value of the transaction. Consider three 
scenarios for a necktie offering at an outlet store: 
Tie offered without discount advertising for $100. 
Tie offered for twenty-percent off with a price tag of $125. 
($100 at register). 
Tie offered for twenty-percent off with a price tag of $125 
($100 at register), but ties were never sold at a bona fide price 
of $125. 
The first scenario offers the consumer one consolidated 
gain (the tie) and one consolidated loss ($100 payment). The se-
cond and third scenarios keep the loss consolidated but segre-
gate the gains. The consumer receives the tie (one gain), the 
$25 “savings” (a second gain), and experiences one consolidated 
loss ($100). Effectively, the consumer receives the same value 
but enjoys an experience similar to winning the lottery twice.78 
If the third, “fictitious” presentation causes the transaction to 
take place because it apparently maximizes utility, should its 
fictitious nature matter to the consumer? Should regulators let 
the consumer proceed in ignorance, enjoying the utility from 
the two gains, or should they intervene?  
These questions cut to one of the essences of the problem 
with regulating fictitious pricing. Is there harm to the individ-
ual consumer? Framing the harm proves difficult. After all, the 
consumer saw the tie, saw the final price offered at the cash 
register, and transacted. Perhaps, post hoc, the consumer 
would object to the transaction or claim that he would have 
withheld expenditure. Nonetheless, the consumer might have 
behaved differently but for the fictitious discount, perhaps con-
 
 75. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 68, at 268.  
 76. See Thaler, supra note 69, at 18–24.  
 77. Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION 
MAKING 183, 187 (1999).  
 78. See id. Mental accounting proves nuanced. A payment is not neces-
sarily a “loss,” for example. See id. at 188. 
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tinuing to shop, perhaps transacting at a lower “loss” or price. 
As this Article discusses in Part II, pleading individual pecuni-
ary harm has proven frustrating for private plaintiffs.79 The dif-
ficulty of demonstrating individual harm may lead to the con-
clusion that addressing the welfare problem may be left solely 
in the hands of regulators.  
II.  THE CHALLENGE OF DEMONSTRATING INDIVIDUAL 
CONSUMER HARM   
Prior to 1969, in the heyday of FTC enforcement of ficti-
tious pricing, the FTC almost exclusively focused on harm to 
the “marketplace” rather than harm to individual consumers. 
An emphasis on a broader injury to “competition” or “competi-
tion in commerce” may have reflected several dynamics. First, 
the FTC’s statutory mandate emphasized regulation of com-
mercial behavior over—but not to the exclusion of—redressing 
individual injury. Second, the “unfair methods” and the “unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices” may have been easier to prove 
than injury. The simplest regulatory approach may have been 
to enjoin the fictitious-pricing practices.  
In Section A, through an exploration of FTC actions before 
1969, this Article shows the regulatory approach toward ad-
dressing “marketplace harm” rather than individual harm—an 
approach that warrants revisiting today. Interpretation of state 
law offers another avenue for exploring the concept of individu-
al harm. In Section B, this Article shows that Illinois law re-
quires proof of consumer and competitive injury in order for a 
private fictitious pricing claim to proceed. This barrier for pri-
vate litigation in Illinois led Judge Frank Easterbrook to de-
clare that such actions belonged in the province of an attorney 
general. In Section C, this Article shows the recent evolution of 
California law through Kwikset v. Superior Court and Hinojos 
v. Kohl’s. California leans toward penalizing this tactic and en-
joining advertisers from employing it.  
A. HISTORIC APPROACH: MARKETPLACE INJURY 
The FTC took action against fictitious pricing shortly after 
the agency’s creation.80 In the 1920s, a decade noted for expan-
 
 79. As Part III discusses, public regulators can have trouble matching an 
appropriate remedy, too. 
 80. For a history of deceptive-pricing regulation from 1920 until 1962, as 
well as a contemporary account of the state of regulation and the retail market 
in 1962, see Harkrader, supra note 13. 
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sion of mass production and the mass consumer market,81 re-
tailers had already embarked on reference-price promotional 
campaigns.82 The very first FTC Reporter reports cases where 
the FTC deemed promotion of fictitious “sales” of vacuum 
cleaners as an “unfair method of competition.”83 Two 1920 FTC 
cases involving retail sales of pianos typify the nature of ac-
tions taken in that era.84 In Holland Piano Manufacturing Co.,85 
the FTC found that Holland Piano stenciled “high fictitious 
prices on pianos . . . and allow[ed] radical reductions there-
from,” leaving purchasers with the impression that the pianos 
were offered at reduced prices at retail.86 These “reduced prices” 
suspiciously aligned with the “full resale prices received for pi-
anos of equal quality and grade” elsewhere.87 This scheme con-
stituted an “unfair method[] of competition.”88 The FTC unsuc-
cessfully pursued similar claims that same year in FTC v. P.A. 
Starck Piano Co., along with claims of false advertising with 
respect to “special sales” and “economical shipping methods.”89 
Note that both actions invoked unfair competition, per the orig-
inal FTC Act language, indicating that the FTC deemed such 
practices impermissible in the marketplace. The FTC did not 
consider the issue of individual consumer harm in these mat-
ters. 
In the post-war era, the FTC pursued cases against both 
manufacturers and retailers. For example, in Orloff Co.,90 the 
manufacturer, Orloff, shipped watches to retailers with price 
tags affixed. The manufacturer tags displayed high prices, but 
Orloff understood that the watches would be sold by retailers at 
 
 81. See generally Joseph A. Schumpeter, The American Economy in the 
Interwar Period, the Decade of the Twenties, 36 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1946) (dis-
cussing the utility of history for testing economic analysis). 
 82. See Harkrader, supra note 13, at 3. 
 83. Muenzen Specialty Co., 1 F.T.C. 30 (1920). Just before Muenzen Spe-
cialty, a candy manufacturer was found to engage in unfair competition by 
falsely stating that it had priced its candy “below cost.” E.J. Brach & Sons, 1 
F.T.C. 186 (1918). 
 84. The Federal Trade Commission Act established the FTC in 1914, re-
placing the Federal Bureau of Corporations, which had been established in 
1903. See NAT’L ARCHIVES, GUIDE TO FED. RECORDS, RECORDS OF THE FEDER-
AL TRADE COMMISSION 122.1 (1976), http://www.archives.gov/research/guide 
-fed-records/groups/122.html.  
 85. 3 F.T.C. 31 (1920).  
 86. FTC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 148 
(1920). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
 90. 52 F.T.C. 709 (1956). 
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substantially lower prices.91 The FTC found that Orloff “know-
ingly92 placed into the hands of retailers a means and instru-
mentality whereby members of the purchasing public may be 
misled and deceived as to the usual and regular selling prices 
of [Orloff’s] watches . . . .”93  
Orloff typified this era of fictitious-pricing enforcement, 
linking consumer deception in fictitious pricing to substantial 
injury to competitors and “competition in commerce.”94 Upon 
promulgation of the Guides Against Deceptive Pricing in 1958, 
nearly thirty percent of all FTC cease-and-desist orders were 
attributable to “fictitious pricing.”95 Fictitious-pricing actions 
emerged as the “leading type of deception practiced in violation 
of the FTC Act.”96 The 1958 version of the Guides required ac-
tual sales of an item at the reference price, signaling a low tol-
erance for the practice.97 The FTC pursued actions more ag-
gressively in this period than at any other time. 
The fictitious-pricing scheme confronted by the FTC in 
1964 in Crown Publishers provides another typical scenario.98 
Crown had been selling copies of a book to retailers with a price 
mark of $6.00, while recommending to sellers that they in turn 
mark down the book to $2.98.99 Crown knew that no retailer ev-
er sold copies of that book for $6.00.100 The FTC found that the 
publisher had “the tendency and capacity to mislead and de-
ceive [consumers] into believing that by purchasing the 
book . . . at $2.98 or at any price less than $6.00, they [would 
be] saving the difference between the lower price and $6.00.”101 
The FTC found Crown’s actions to be “all to the prejudice and 
injury of the public and of respondents’ competitors and consti-
tute unfair and deceptive acts and practices and unfair meth-
 
 91. Id. at 711. 
 92. Id. at 715 (“It is absurd to suppose that [Orloff] would . . . engage 
in the empty and financially wasteful practice of supplying retail price 
tags to their customers if such tags were not being used by [retailers] to 
advantage in the sale of [the] watches . . . . [Orloff] cannot therefore deny 
their authorship of, or escape responsibility for, a device which to their 
knowledge is being widely used for deceptive purposes.”). 
 93. Id. at 717. 
 94. Id. at 716. 
 95. Harkrader, supra note 13, at 4 n.10. 
 96. Id. at 3–4. 
 97. See Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, 23 Fed. Reg. 7965, 7966 (Oct. 
15, 1958). 
 98. Crown Publishers, Inc., 66 F.T.C. 1488 (1964). 
 99. Id. at 1489. 
 100. Id. at 1499. 
 101. Id. at 1517. 
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ods of competition . . . .”102 Here, the FTC recognized the concept 
of potential injury to consumers but focused on “competitive in-
jury.” 
These actions show how the FTC played the role of mar-
ketplace referee before 1969. The FTC aimed primarily to pre-
serve integrity and fairness among competitors with only a sec-
ondary concern for consumer welfare. These enforcement 
efforts foreshadowed the tenor of the 1983 Policy Statement on 
Deception, which permits a finding of materiality without re-
quiring evidence of tangible consumer harm. In Crown Publish-
ers, the FTC indicated that consumer testimony about decep-
tion, though worthy of incorporating in the record, was not 
required for determining whether a practice constitutes decep-
tion.103 The FTC had room to find deception, even without proof 
of injury to consumers or competitors, though some finding of 
both might support a case.  
In Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC,104 the Second Circuit did 
not even require the FTC to prove that competitors demon-
strated an injury.105 The “inference that [a marketer] by its mis-
leading initial approach attracted business which it would not 
otherwise have obtained” was permissible.106 Again, in this era, 
the FTC and the courts focused more on the nature of the activ-
ities, assuming a general harm to the marketplace. “The law is 
violated if the first contact . . . is secured by deception . . . even 
though the true facts are made known to the buyer before he 
enters into the contract of purchase.”107 Under this approach, 
 
 102. Id. at 1516. 
 103. Id. at 1497 (“Actual consumer testimony is in fact not needed to sup-
port an inference of deception by the Commission.”). 
 104. 295 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 105. Exposition Press is a general deception case that addresses FTC 
standards for proof of injury, which implicate deceptive discounting cases. Id. 
In this case, the FTC “did not explicitly marshal evidence of the existence of 
other [sellers] competing with [the target], the fact that there are such pub-
lishers emerges amply from a reading of the record as a whole.” Id. at 873. 
 106. Id. Actual proof that one actor injured another specific actor in a 
crowded marketplace would resemble a burden of proof similar to private 
claims brought under the Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2014); 
see, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 583 
(1986) (determining that price-•xing did not inflict injury and that claimant 
actually stood to gain from the higher market prices); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort 
of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 118–19 (1986) (rejecting a lost-pro•ts claim based 
on lower market prices resulting from a merger which may have caused injury 
because the resulting lower prices were not anti-competitive).  
 107. Exposition Press, 295 F.2d at 873 (quoting Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 
186 F.2d 821, 824 (7th Cir. 1951)); see also Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc. v. 
FTC, 202 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1953); Progress Tailoring Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 103 
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even if the buyer discovers that an item was fictitiously priced 
before buying it, the absence of pure “benefit-of-the-bargain” 
damages did not absolve the seller. Proof of injury to the public 
interest took primacy in enforcement. Even if consumer harm 
had not been proven, harm to the public could be found and 
remedied by the FTC. 
However, after the FTC ceased enforcement, most private 
litigants, often using a class action mechanism, did have to 
show pecuniary injury. The abandonment of fictitious pricing 
emerged from a host of sweeping changes at the FTC in 1969. A 
“wild and wooly group of students known as ‘Nader’s Raiders’” 
berated the FTC for focusing on trivial abuses at the expense of 
more serious fraud.108 The Raiders criticized the Commission 
for “lethargy among the legal staff, political favoritism, inept 
management, and a poorly functioning monitoring system.”109 
Though the Raiders’ critique was not the first sharp critique of 
the FTC, nor was the critique itself novel, unlike previous stud-
ies, “[i]t sparked a series of political actions that eventually re-
vitalized the agency.”110  
The Nader Report spurred President Nixon to ask the 
American Bar Association (ABA) to study reform of the FTC 
and make recommendations.111 In the 1969 ABA Report, Rich-
ard Posner concluded that deceptive-pricing enforcement wast-
ed resources.112 The other committee members did not disagree. 
Posner concluded that the more than five million dollars that 
the FTC “expended in the area of fraudulent and unfair mar-
keting practices” in the 1963 fiscal year “bought precious little 
consumer protection.”113  
After President Nixon received the 1969 ABA Report, he 
charged the FTC “‘to initiate a new era of vigorous action’ to 
protect the consumer.”114 “Sound economic analysis” would 
prove central to setting priorities for the Bureau of Consumer 
 
(7th Cir. 1946).  
 108. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 44, § 8:2. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Cox, supra note 26 (quoting HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 26). Cox, the 
author of the article, was a “Raider.” Id. at 899.   
 111. See 1969 ABA REPORT, supra note 26; Letter from President Richard 
Nixon to William T. Gossett, supra note 26. See generally MARTIN, supra note 
26 (“[The ABA’s conclusions were] remarkably similar to the conclusions of 
Nader’s Raiders . . . .”). 
 112. See 1969 ABA REPORT, supra note 26, at 61–82. 
 113. Id. at 77. 
 114. Cox, supra note 26, at 906 (quoting HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 26, 
at 166).  
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Protection, a newly established FTC division.115 FTC fictitious-
pricing enforcement ceased contemporaneously with this reor-
ganization.  
The states continued to see activity, including from private 
actors enforcing state consumer statutes. In Sections B and C, 
this Article discusses the approaches of Illinois and California, 
respectively, in addressing private fictitious-pricing claims. Il-
linois law appears to close the door to private consumer liti-
gants. California leaves the door open but offers scant guidance 
on remedies. 
B. PRIVATE LITIGATION AND INDIVIDUAL HARM 
Recent private fictitious-pricing cases litigated under Illi-
nois and California law show the challenge of demonstrating 
economic harm.116 Applying Illinois law, a federal district court 
declined to find a remedy for a private plaintiff claiming harm 
from fictitious-pricing deception.117 Nonetheless, a transaction 
borne in deception might inflict some consumer harm in some 
cases. In one private consumer action under California law, the 
Ninth Circuit focused on problems inherent in the underlying 
deception, building a case for discerning actual economic harm 
without offering a satisfactory theory for framing pecuniary 
damages. 
Private actors attempting to sue retailers under deceptive-
pricing statutes can have difficulty pleading a theory of damag-
es. Where statutory damages are unavailable, implicitly, eco-
nomic or “actual” damages must be proven by private parties, 
or at least alleged, in the class action context.118  
This degree of difficulty may explain why there are few re-
ported cases where private consumer fictitious-pricing actions 
have been brought. Nonetheless, the facts of these modern cas-
es illustrate the nature of the harm, and this Article explores 
them here. 
1. Illinois Approach 
Courts have recently confronted private fictitious-pricing 
 
 115. Id.  
 116. This Article defers discussion of public state enforcement approaches 
until Part III. 
 117. See infra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of the Illinois statute and case 
law. 
 118. See Kim v. Carter’s Inc., 598 F.3d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 2010) (“A private 
party, however, must show ‘actual damage’ in order to maintain an action un-
der the ICFA.”); see also 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10a (2007). 
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actions brought under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Decep-
tive Business Practices Act (ICFA).119 In Camasta v. Jos. A 
Bank Clothiers, Inc.,120 the plaintiff consumer claimed that the 
clothing retailer Jos. A. Bank Clothiers (JABC) advertised 
“sales prices” which induced him to buy six shirts at one of the 
retailer’s stores.121 The consumer alleged that he later discov-
ered that the price he paid was not the product of a “temporary 
price reduction,” but rather the result of “a sales practice of ad-
vertising the normal retail price as a temporary price reduction 
at all of its 31 retail locations in Illinois.”122  
The Camasta plaintiff claimed that had he known that the 
advertised “sale” price was actually the regular price, he “would 
not have been induced to purchase [the shirts], could have pur-
chased [the shirts] for less than the amount paid, or could have 
gone to another retail store for a true ‘sale’ price of a compara-
ble item, or shopped around and obtained a better price in the 
marketplace.”123 This plaintiff struggled to demonstrate a pecu-
niary injury. If the plaintiff knew the price at the point-of-sale, 
had the opportunity to walk away, and still engaged in the ex-
change, was there harm? The Camasta court found none, draw-
ing upon prior appellate interpretations of ICFA.124  
In Kim v. Carter’s Inc.125 and Mulligan v. QVC, Inc.,126 the 
Seventh Circuit and Illinois Court of Appeals, respectively, 
found similar complaints bereft of claims for contractual dam-
ages (i.e., deprivation of the “benefit of the bargain”).127 For ex-
ample, in Kim, the plaintiff claimed that Carter’s sold t-shirts 
at a thirty-percent discount off a fictitious “suggested price.”128 
The Seventh Circuit again held that there was no pecuniary 
harm to the consumer if an item was sold at a discount from a 
fictitious price, because the actual price offered and accepted at 
the ultimate point of sale served as the contractual price.129 
Therefore, no tangible, identifiable economic damages had been 
inflicted. In Mulligan, for similar reasons, the Illinois appellate 
court found that even if seller QVC (a television marketing 
 
 119. Id. 505/1–/12. 
 120. No. 12-C-7782 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2013). 
 121. Id. at 2. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 5. 
 125. 598 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 126. 888 N.E.2d 1190 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). 
 127. Kim, 598 F.3d at 365; Mulligan, 888 N.E.2d at 1196–97. 
 128. Kim, 598 F.3d at 363. 
 129. Id. at 365–66. 
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channel) compared fictitious “actual retail prices” against QVC 
prices, ICFA would not offer the plaintiff economic damages.130 
Without economic damages, the private mechanism does not 
enable consumers to police the market in the courts. 
Competitors can also make claims against other competi-
tors for injuriously deceptive discount pricing. Sellers rarely 
appear to pursue actions against rivals engaging in fictitious 
pricing, probably because causation and damages are difficult 
to prove. First, proving that competitive damage emanated 
from one particular seller in a crowded marketplace presents a 
challenge. Second, proving that price confusion was the proxi-
mate cause that led customers to switch a purchase to the 
cheating competitor, also presents difficulty. These injuries are 
not difficult to conceptualize—but they are quite difficult to 
prove. The Restatement of Unfair Competition also notes the 
difficulty of “establish[ing] a clear nexus” between fictitious 
pricing and harm to a particular seller.131 
The only recent reported seller-against-seller dispute offers 
an example of the difficulty of proving a “horizontal claim.” In 
B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp.,132 a jewelry re-
tailer brought an unsuccessful fictitious-pricing claim against a 
competitor, based on the Illinois statute133 and the Lanham 
Act.134 In B. Sanfield, a local, stand-alone jewelry store in Rock-
ford, Illinois sued a retailer, Finlay Fine Jewelry, which oper-
ated within department stores at over 800 locations.135 Finlay 
regularly sold its affordable wares at a declared fifty-percent 
discount.136 This discount was “phony,”137 as the discounts were 
 
 130. Mulligan, 888 N.E.2d at 1196–98. 
 131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. d (AM. LAW 
INST. 1995). 
 132. 999 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D. Ill. 1999), vacated, 168 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 
1999), remanded to 76 F. Supp. 2d 868 (N.D. Ill. 1999), aff’d, 258 F.3d 578 (7th 
Cir. 2001).  
 133. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 470.220 (1989). 
 134. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012) (“Any person who . . . uses in commerce 
any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any 
. . . false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representa-
tion of fact, which . . . (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepre-
sents the nature . . . of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or com-
mercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes 
that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”). The Seventh Circuit 
ultimately consulted the FTC’s Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, 16 C.F.R. 
§ 233.1, for application of the Lanham Act. See B. Sanfield, Inc., 258 F.3d 578, 
579–80 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 135. B. Sanfield, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 1102, 1103–04 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
 136. B. Sanfield, Inc., 258 F.3d at 579. 
 137. Id. 
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rarely suspended, and few items were ever sold at the “one-
hundred percent” full reference price. Occasionally, “but never 
on a Saturday or during December[,] Finlay remove[d] . . . ‘sale’ 
signs and [offered] items at higher prices, but less than 3 per-
cent of its sales [were] made that way-and if a customer ask[ed] 
for the 50 percent discount during regular-price days, Fin-
lay . . . happ[ily] obliged.”138  
The district court held that such practices “were not false 
or even misleading because customers see through the ruse.”139 
The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected this conclusion, noting 
that the lower court had conflated injury with falsity.140 A prac-
tice need not injure in order to meet the falsity threshold, ac-
cording to the appellate court, but injury would still need to be 
demonstrated for relief.141 The Seventh Circuit vacated the orig-
inal district court ruling for failing to make such a determina-
tion,142 and the district court subsequently found no injury.143 
On appeal once again, the district court’s finding of no injury 
was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit, defendant Finlay ulti-
mately prevailing.144 
Sanfield ultimately lost before the Seventh Circuit because 
of the challenge of proving injury in a horizontal claim.145 
Sanfield first claimed that it had to pay for corrective advertis-
ing to inform consumers that they should focus on absolute 
prices, not “phantom” prices, but it simply failed to establish 
this fact before the district court.146 Sanfield also contended that 
customers demanded fifty-percent markdowns to match Finlay, 
and when Sanfield refused such demands, customers left the 
store.147 The court found insufficient evidence to support a 
causal link between lost business and Finlay’s fictitious offers: 
Many people who walk through Sanfield’s door would fish for dis-
counts even if Finlay were to change its business methods . . . . [T]he 
district judge sought . . . some evidence that Sanfield’s sales were in-
fluenced by Finlay’s practices. For example, did Sanfield’s sales rise 
on weekdays, when Finlay was most likely to take down its “sale” 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 168 F.3d 967, 967 (7th 
Cir. 1999). 
 143. B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 868, 
874–75 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
 144. B. Sanfield, Inc., 258 F.3d at 582. 
 145. Id. at 580–82. 
 146. Id. at 580–81. 
 147. Id. at 581. 
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signs? The district judge observed that Sanfield’s sales rose during 
the months covered by its claims and that attributing any particular 
lost business to Finlay is difficult: “Finlay and Sanfield did not com-
pete exclusively with each other; rather, there were numerous other 
competitors for sales of the gold jewelry at issue.” If these other rivals 
sold for less than Finlay, then they would be the likely source of di-
verted business . . . .148  
Private relief was not available, but the court indicated in 
dicta that regulators would have had a much easier time prov-
ing a fictitious-pricing claim; they would not have had to 
demonstrate injury to a seller or consumer. As Judge Easter-
brook noted in his collective interpretation and review of the 
Lanham Act, the FTC Guides, and Illinois law, “if the FTC or 
the Attorney General of Illinois were to bring an action . . . the 
court would issue an injunction in a trice. But . . . the plain-
tiff . . . is not a public prosecutor. It is a jewelry store, one of 
[the defendant’s] rivals . . . and to prevail it must show inju-
ry.”149 His opinion concluded with a repetition of this point: 
“[The plaintiff] fancies itself a private attorney general, but it 
has not been appointed to that office, and as a private litigant 
must show injury, which it did not.”150 
Judge Easterbrook begs the question—if Sanfield cannot 
be a private attorney general, where is the public attorney gen-
eral? Where is the FTC? The FTC would have an easier path to 
put a stop to confusing fictitious-pricing behavior (in a “trice”), 
had the matter been before it. As this Article discusses in Part 
IV, the FTC justified discontinuing fictitious-pricing enforce-
ment under the logic that larger, incumbent department stores 
would urge the FTC to harass discounters. In this case, ironi-
cally, a local single-store retailer brought a complaint against 
an 800-location seller operating out of department stores.151 In 
this “Bambi-Meets-Godzilla”-like152 Sanfield conflict, Bambi 
cannot prove injury under Illinois law, despite Godzilla’s at-
tack. Only the regulators, according to Judge Easterbrook, can 
insulate Bambi from deceptive tactics. These activities could be 
much more easily ended by the FTC, which has the power to fo-
cus on marketplace behavior, rather than prove actual injury. 
The complexity and difficulty of these Illinois private ac-
 
 148. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 149. Id. at 580. 
 150. Id. at 582. 
 151. B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1102, 1104 
(N.D. Ill. 1998). 
 152. See Marv Newland, Bambi Meets Godzilla, YOUTUBE (Apr. 8, 2006), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BXCUBVS4kfQ.  
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tions, consumer and seller, demonstrate that private actions 
will not police fictitious pricing. Regulators are best situated to 
do so, and the FTC can set that tone at the federal level153 by 
moving away from zero enforcement. California offers a more 
open avenue for private claims, but direct consumer remedies 
may still prove elusive.  
2. California Approach 
California consumer law can have an outsized impact on 
national commercial norms.154 California’s fictitious-pricing 
regulatory regime, a product of legislation, voter referendum 
and case law, differs from Illinois in its approach toward dis-
cerning an injury. California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) 
affords civil remedies to consumers who suffer injury from “un-
lawful, unfair or fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s].”155 Af-
ter California voters approved Proposition 64 in 2004,156 revis-
ing the standing threshold for private actors in suits under the 
UCL,157 and by reference, California’s False Advertising Law 
(FAL),158 a question arose about the nature of the injury that 
would need to be demonstrated for a private UCL suit to pro-
ceed.159  
 
 153. As noted in the Introduction, state action does not effectively address 
fictitious pricing. Paul Rubin argues that state regulation of advertising is less 
competent than federal regulation and is politically-driven while also under-
staffed. He also expresses concerns that multiple overlapping regulators might 
“lead to more restriction of advertising than is appropriate.” Paul H. Rubin, 
Information Regulation (Including Regulation of Advertising), in 3 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 271, 274 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De 
Geest eds., 2000). 
 154. California’s gross domestic product (GDP) was $2 trillion in 2011, con-
stituting thirteen percent of the nation’s output. The California economy 
equates to that of the ninth largest country in the world. LEGISLATIVE ANA-
LYST’S OFFICE, 2013 CAL FACTS (2013), http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2013/ 
calfacts/calfacts_010213.aspx#Californias_Economy. 
 155. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2015). Also of note, local pros-
ecutors have the authority to bring UCL actions. See Order of Final Judgment, 
California v. Southdale Kay-Bee Toy Inc. (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 2003) (No. 26-
15784); Jay Goetting, Toy Story: Napa To Get $200,000 in Lawsuit, NAPA VAL-
LEY REG. (Aug. 20, 2003), http://napavalleyregister.com/news/toy-story-napa 
-to-get-in-lawsuit/article_61d89f98-a858-5fe6-af0d-8f26459414e7.html. 
 156. TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS 109–10 (2004), http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ 
2004/general/propositions/prop64text.pdf. 
 157. Limiting standing to any person “who has suffered injury in fact and 
has lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition.” Id. 
 158. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17500–17509 (West 2015); Ko-
rea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 943 (Cal. 2003) (stating 
that the UCL can “borrow[] violations from other laws by making them inde-
pendently actionable as unfair competitive practices”). 
 159. See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 881–82 (Cal. 
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In Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme 
Court addressed the question of what a consumer would have 
to allege to show an “economic injury from unfair competi-
tion.”160 Though this case is not a private case, nor is it a ficti-
tious-pricing case, the arguments lay a foundation for private 
fictitious-pricing litigation. The Court noted that there were 
“innumerable ways” for a consumer to show injury from unfair 
competition, such as: 
(1) surrender[ing] in a transaction more, or acquir[ing] in a transac-
tion less, than he or she otherwise would have;  
(2) hav[ing] a present or future property interest diminished;  
(3) be[ing] deprived of money or property to which he or she has a 
cognizable claim; or  
(4) be[ing] required to enter into a transaction, costing money or 
property, that would otherwise have been unnecessary.161 
Kwikset did not address fictitious pricing, but rather a de-
ceptive “origin of the goods” claim.162 The plaintiff’s claim re-
sulted from being misled about the origin of goods he purchased 
from Kwikset—locksets advertised as “Made in the U.S.A.” that 
contained components manufactured overseas.163 The plaintiffs 
alleged that before transacting, they “saw and read [Kwikset’s] 
misrepresentations [about origin,] . . . relied on such misrepre-
sentations in deciding to purchase . . . [the locksets] . . . and 
would not have purchased them if they had not been so misrep-
resented.”164 The false-origin claim caused the plaintiffs to buy 
products that they did not want causing them to “spend and 
lose . . . [the] money . . . paid for the locksets,” thereby “suf-
fer[ing] injury and loss of money.”165 
The Kwikset court, though discussing origin and not pric-
ing, boiled down the problem: “Simply stated: labels matter. 
The marketing industry is based on the premise that labels 
matter [and] that consumers will choose one product over an-
other similar product based on its label . . . .”166 This logic 
should support an argument that price labeling “matters,” and 
that price labeling tries to achieve the same goal of persuading 
consumers to choose one product over a similar one: 
For each consumer who relies on the truth and accuracy of a label and 
 
2011). 
 160. Id. at 885. 
 161. Id. at 885–86. 
 162. Id. at 882–83. 
 163. Id. at 881–82. 
 164. Id. at 883. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 889. 
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is deceived by misrepresentations into making a purchase, the eco-
nomic harm is the same: the consumer has purchased a product that 
he or she paid more for than he or she otherwise might have been 
willing to pay if the product had been labeled accurately. This eco-
nomic harm—the loss of real dollars from a consumer’s pocket—is the 
same whether or not a court might objectively view the products as 
functionally equivalent.167 
The analogy of an origin case to a deceptive pricing case is 
imperfect. A price is not a description of the goods. As the 
Kwikset court notes, wine labeled “Kosher” loses all value to the 
Kosher-observant consumer who discovers later that the wine 
origin is not Kosher.168 With price, a moment of transactional 
reckoning comes at the cash register or on the checkout page of 
a website. The retailer presents the actual price at that mo-
ment and the consumer transacts at that price. The question is 
whether the presented actual price, if fictitious, caused econom-
ic harm to the consumer. A disgruntled Kohl’s customer, armed 
with the Kwikset decision, received an affirmative response to 
that question from the Ninth Circuit, sharply contrasting with 
the Illinois outcome.  
In Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., the plaintiff alleged a fictitious-
pricing claim against retailer Kohl’s, claiming that he pur-
chased luggage and clothing items that were either routinely 
sold at the advertised “sale” price, or that the “advertised . . . 
‘regular’ prices did not reflect prevailing retail market prices 
during the three months immediately preceding [their] publica-
tion.”169 Hinojos rounded out his complaint pleading “that he 
‘would not have purchased [these] products at Kohl’s in the ab-
sence of Kohl’s misrepresentations.’”170 In his opinion, Judge 
Stephen Reinhardt opened with a diatribe about fictitious pric-
ing: 
Most consumers have . . . purchased merchandise that was marketed 
as . . . “on sale” because the proffered discount seemed too good to 
pass up. Retailers, well aware of consumers’ susceptibility to a bar-
gain . . . have an incentive to lie to their customers by falsely claiming 
that their products have previously sold at a far higher “original” 
price . . . to induce customers to purchase merchandise at a purport-
 
 167. Id. at 890. 
 168. Id. at 889. For an argument for honoring consumer preferences with 
respect to the processes behind a product rather than the mere qualities of the 
product per se, see Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Pro-
cess/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 526, 526 (2004) (examining the conceptual distinction between “process-
related information” and “product-related information”). 
 169. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 2013). The issue 
presented was whether the plaintiff had standing. Id. at 1103. 
 170. Id. at 1102. 
950 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:921 
 
edly marked-down “sale” price. Because such practices are mislead-
ing—and effective—the California legislature . . . prohibited them.171 
Judge Reinhardt accurately observed that the California 
legislature specifically addressed the marketing behavior that 
Hinojos alleged. The California FAL provides a crisp rule re-
garding unfair advertising with respect to former-price compar-
isons172:  
No price shall be advertised as a former price of any advertised thing, 
unless the alleged former price was the prevailing market price . . . 
within three months next immediately preceding the publication of 
the advertisement or unless the date when the alleged former price 
did prevail is . . . stated in the advertisement.173 
The California standard for establishing the reference price 
is much less forgiving than the FTC Guides. The former price 
must be the prevailing market price, not an actual former price 
offered under some vague standard of good faith. If not, the re-
tailer must actually declare with precision when the former 
price was offered. If enforced, the standard could provide con-
sumers with greater confidence in the discounts that they ob-
serve—and retailers with concrete guidance about discount 
promotion. But risks associated with discount promotion might 
cause advertisers to shy away from such campaigns, which may 
reduce competition. 
That aside, the California standard for establishing indi-
vidual harm stands apart from Illinois. The facts of Hinojos 
matched the Kwikset requirements for recognizing an economic 
injury, thus establishing standing for the plaintiff.174 Judge 
Reinhardt concluded that “price advertisements matter” in con-
sumer decision making175 and more specifically, “‘regular’ or 
‘original’ price [advertisements matter,] provid[ing] important 
information about the product’s worth and . . . prestige.”176 Cit-
ing marketing scholarship, Judge Reinhardt noted that dis-
counts “created an impression of savings . . . enhancing . . . will-
ingness to buy the product,” while prematurely stopping the 
consumer’s search for a lower price.177 Reference-price misin-
 
 171. Id. at 1101. 
 172. In turn, unfair advertising equates to unfair competition under the 
UCL. Id. at 1103. 
 173. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17501 (West 2015). 
 174. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1107; cf. Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 
P.3d 877, 892–95 (Cal. 2011) (applying the requirements of the UCL and con-
cluding that the plaintiff had standing). 
 175. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1107. 
 176. Id. at 1106. 
 177. Id. (citing Grewal & Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising, supra 
note 12, at 55). 
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formation would matter to consumers in the same way that any 
false label would.178 Kwikset analogized that selling a falsely-
labeled Rolex watch would inflict harm on consumers, even if 
the watch functioned and looked exactly like a Rolex.179 
Judge Reinhardt contended that fictitious pricing could in-
flict even more injury than the deceptive-origin claim in 
Kwikset. “The deceived bargain hunter suffers a more obvious 
economic injury as a result of false advertising . . . because the 
bargain hunter’s expectations about the product he just pur-
chased is precisely that it has a higher perceived value and 
therefore has a higher resale value.”180 
Further, the Hinojos court pointedly rejected the defend-
ant’s argument, accepted in Illinois, that the plaintiff received 
the “benefit of the bargain,” noting that the price-reference 
misrepresentation at issue was “material.”181 Judge Reinhardt 
referenced common-law definitions of materiality, but also not-
ed that the deceptive-pricing prohibition made the misrepre-
sentation per se material.182 Hinojos’ allegations “that Kohl’s 
made material misrepresentations [inducing] him to buy prod-
ucts he would not otherwise have purchased” were sufficient to 
support the standing requirements for economic injury.183 
Though the Kwikset and Hinojos cases proffer the notion 
that a fictitious-pricing plaintiff can formulate a sufficient inju-
ry claim to support standing, how to calculate that remedy re-
mains unclear. The remedy may be material, but after depar-
ture from benefit-of-the-bargain theory, theorizing damages 
proves difficult. Though Judge Reinhardt locates private 
harm—harm that can be avoided not just through private en-
forcement, but also through public enforcement—the magni-
tude of that harm could prove difficult to measure. Hinojos does 
not explicitly solve the harm-measurement puzzle completely 
cast aside by Illinois law, but it raises the Kwikset questions 
that should weigh in the calculation of the benefits of renewed 
enforcement.  
III.  THE WELFARE IMPACT OF FICTITIOUS PRICING   
A strong consensus supports the finding that fictitious pric-
ing interferes with markets, yields inefficiency, and reduces 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. (citing Kwikset, 246 P.3d at 890).  
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1107. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
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welfare. However, regulators need to exercise precision in com-
batting fictitious pricing to ensure that price competition would 
not be truly diminished. There is a role for regulation and en-
forcement, even though none is happening on the federal level 
now. Even the harshest critics of fictitious-pricing enforcement 
concede that some scenarios are severe enough to warrant 
prosecution.184 
In Section A, this Article discusses the welfare-driven ar-
guments offered against enforcement by Robert Pitofsky. In 
Section B, this Article counters the arguments in Section A 
with conclusions from the body of economic and marketing lit-
erature that overwhelmingly show that fictitious pricing dis-
torts competition and diminishes welfare. Finally, in Section C, 
this Article examines the approaches taken by the New York 
Attorney General in two settlement decrees, and by a Califor-
nia court in People v. Overstock.com. These approaches point 
toward the proper, welfare-maximizing approach, while avoid-
ing the problem of demonstrating individual injury.  
 A. WELFARE ARGUMENTS AGAINST ENFORCEMENT 
Robert Pitofsky’s arguments for ceasing FTC enforcement 
warrant notice.185 His 1977 Harvard Law Review article186 pro-
vided the deepest publicly available insight into the rationale 
behind enforcement discontinuation. Pitofsky offered a rigorous 
framework for justifying regulatory intervention, identifying 
factors that would indicate an advertising-driven “market fail-
ure.”187 In sum, Pitofsky expressed certainty that retail mar-
kets, if left unfettered, would fail to consistently produce suffi-
cient and accurate information about quality—and price. Yet, 
 
 184. See Pitofsky, Pricing Laws, supra note 17, at 62–63 (advancing multi-
ple arguments for why it is unwise policy to prosecute fictitious pricing “except 
in the most extreme and egregious circumstances”). 
 185. Pitofsky has been described as a “Founding Father” of the “modern 
FTC.” Muris, supra note 19. In addition to working in academia, Pitofsky au-
thored the historic 1969 ABA Report, headed the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer 
Protection, and served as FTC Commissioner and Chairman. Id. 
 186. Pitofsky, Beyond Nader, supra note 20. 
 187. Id. at 663–66. From reading Pitofsky’s article, it is possible to discern 
characteristics that suggest a market failure. They include (1) where consum-
ers have difficulty tracking and comparing the variety of constantly changing 
offers and pricing information; (2) when competition does not always provide 
accurate information about price and quality—and “rivals . . . rarely . . . 
challeng[e] . . . questionable claims”; (3) when markets have limited competi-
tion due to market structure, leading to low-information advertising on price 
and quality; (4) when the cost of information provision proves too high when 
the consumer market remains small; and (5) where sellers have better use for 
their advertising budget than rebutting claims of rivals. Id. 
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Pitofsky rejected the notion that enforcing fictitious-pricing 
regulation would produce a net benefit for consumers. 
Pitofsky shared at length his well-developed views of the 
aims of advertising regulation. He linked consumer access to 
“truthful data” with “effective competition in the market,”188 ob-
serving that access to truthful advertising facilitates price 
comparison.189 False advertising, he recognized, can lead to 
“misallocation of economic resources . . . by diverting trade to 
high priced premium products that differ from cheaper substi-
tutes only in the quality and volume of advertising.”190 Pitofsky 
noted that “where product claims are viewed with utter suspi-
cion, high price is adopted as an indication of quality, and price 
competition . . . become[s] economically irrational.”191  
Though these observations should raise concerns about fic-
titious pricing, Pitofsky believed consumers could fend for 
themselves on this front. Consumer protection from false ad-
vertising, he maintained: 
should not be a broad, theoretical effort to achieve Truth, but rather a 
practical enterprise . . . . [W]here consumers are fully capable, 
through common sense or simple observation, of protecting their in-
terests against advertising exaggerations or distortions, there would 
be no reason for the law to intervene.192 
Fictitious-pricing enforcement may “achieve Truth,” but 
Pitofsky asks, at what cost? Would enforcement enhance, pre-
serve, or harm price competition? Are consumers capable of 
“protecting their interests” through “simple observation” in this 
context?193 Pitofsky viewed enforcement as unjustifiable.194 Even 
in an era of renewed advertising regulation efforts, he ques-
tioned allocating resources toward pursuit of fictitious-pricing 
claims.195  
Pitofsky acknowledged that fictitious-pricing tactics could 
inflict “competitive or consumer injuries” by misdirecting buy-
ers “from the more efficient low-price seller, [causing execution 
of purchases] . . . that might not otherwise occur” or occur at 
that time.196 He conceded that consumers might be deprived of 
 
 188. Id. at 671. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See id. at 687–88 (arguing that fictitious pricing enforcement is un-
necessary and costly). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. Armstrong and Chen more recently raised concern about this dy-
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the “benefits of the bargain they thought they were receiv-
ing.”197  
Ultimately, however, Pitofsky dismissed the significance of 
fictitious pricing, labeling the tactics “innocuous.” He assumed 
that price-comparison shopping would be frictionless, or that 
consumers would dismiss aggressive discount claims as puff-
ery.198 Pitofsky contended that if “consumers [were] accurately 
informed of the offering price, they [could] make sensible deci-
sions.”199 This contention assumed away a fundamental prob-
lem—the “offering price” has not been “accurately informed” if 
the associated reference price providing context proves ficti-
tious—and the earlier discussion of the role of behavioral eco-
nomics explains why. 
Pitofsky expressed structural concerns about the role of 
discount pricing in retail markets, particularly that fictitious-
pricing enforcement would derail retail “discounters,” key driv-
ers of competition.200 Enforcement would deter discounter mar-
ket entry and disproportionately burden existing discounters. 
Pitofsky warned that incumbent “nondiscounters” would regu-
larly report discounters to the FTC, using regulation as a 
weapon.201 He summarized his argument that enforcement 
would disrupt price competition: 
Aggressive enforcement against discounters that forces them to hew 
close to the line of accurate information may tend to dampen competi-
tive activity. Often . . . discount promotions . . . assist new entrants in 
penetrating concentrated markets . . . . [T]he cost . . . of ascertaining 
whether particular discount claims are accurate may deter [sellers] 
from making such claims at all.202  
Pitofsky’s position on fictitious pricing has proven durable. 
In 1991, Timothy Muris echoed the 1977 logic at length.203 
 
namic. See generally Armstrong & Chen, supra note 12, at 25 (describing eco-
nomic models of consumer responses to discounted prices, and concluding, 
“[b]ecause of their incentive to mislead customers, in some—but not all—of the 
situations we discuss, there is a potential role for policy to prevent sellers ad-
vertising false discounts”). 
 197. Pitofsky, Beyond Nader, supra note 20, at 688 (emphasis added). 
 198. Id. at 687–88 (arguing that “unlikely” claims such as “lowest price ev-
er” or ambiguous discounts “will be ignored by almost all customers”). 
 199. Id. at 688. 
 200. See id. 
 201. Id. Perhaps the observations about favor for high-quality incumbents 
in the wood, fur, and textiles industries, noted by Posner, and referenced in 
the 1969 ABA Report, explains this view. See 1969 ABA REPORT, supra note 
26, at 34. 
 202. Pitofsky, Beyond Nader, supra note 20, at 688. 
 203. See Timothy J. Muris, Economics and Consumer Protection, 60 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 103, 111–16 (1991).  
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Muris also cited the 1989 Report of the ABA Antitrust Section 
Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade 
Commission (1989 Report) for the premise that excessive regu-
lation of price advertising could ultimately injure consumers.204 
The 1989 Report concluded that “[e]xcessive regulation of pric-
ing claims can harm consumers, as experts on advertising have 
come to appreciate.”205 The sole expert expressly cited in the 
1989 Report was Pitofsky.206  
In 2004, Pitofsky reiterated his criticisms of fictitious-
pricing enforcement, with special emphasis on state-level en-
forcement activity.207 Concerned about the “varied landscape of 
state laws,” he suggested that states should repeal their con-
sumer-protection statutes relating to fictitious pricing and only 
pursue enforcement in the “most extreme and egregious cir-
cumstances.”208 Since 1969, “extreme and egregious” fictitious-
pricing circumstances may have presented themselves some-
where, but the FTC has not pursued a single seller during that 
period. Pitofsky repeated verbatim his 1977 concerns about the 
social and economic costs of enforcement, the “dampen[ing] of 
competitive activity” from having to “hew close to the line of ac-
curate information,” and the anti-competitive effects that would 
result from potential deterrence of discount claims.209 
With the retail environment of the 1970s long gone, 
Pitofsky expressed the very same concerns about fictitious-
pricing regulation in 2004, maintaining that “the FTC . . . made 
the judgment, correctly . . . that the chilling effect of deceptive 
pricing regulation on retailers, and the inherent subjectivity 
and difficulty in ascertaining compliance, have brought about 
more harm than good.”210 Pitofsky observed that informed con-
sumers had better evaluative tools in 2004 for making price 
comparisons, noting the newfound ability to check prices with 
 
 204. Id. at 112. 
 205. ABA, REPORT OF THE ABA ANTITRUST SECTION SPECIAL COMMITTEE 
TO STUDY THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 37 (1989) (emphasis 
added). The 1989 Report offered a straw-man argument in defense of non-
enforcement. As an illustration of the horribles that could result from en-
forcement, the Report offered the hypothetical of regulators “prohibiting ‘sales’ 
featuring less than 10 percent price reductions” and warning that such a regu-
lation “could increase price rigidity.” Id. The Guides never deemed such a prac-
tice deceptive, and the FTC never contemplated considering such a reduction. 
 206. See id. 
 207. Pitofsky, Pricing Laws, supra note 17, at 62–63. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 63 (citing Pitofsky, Beyond Nader, supra note 20). 
 210. Id.  
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retailers like Amazon.com and e-Bay.211 
Over time, as noted, private and state actions surfaced of-
fering facts that could meet Pitofsky’s “extreme and egregious” 
criteria for FTC enforcement.212 These cases provide grounds for 
specific opportunities for intervention, but more recent evi-
dence emphatically supports a broader policy that includes en-
forcement. In Section B, this Article reassesses the value of en-
forcement, reviewing the literature that has emerged to 
support the premise that fictitious pricing interferes with mar-
kets and reduces welfare. 
B. WELFARE ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING ENFORCEMENT 
Decades of marketing research have revealed the distor-
tions that fictitious pricing can inflict on the market. The liter-
ature has, in fact, played a role in prominent recent fictitious-
pricing litigation. In Hinojos, Judge Reinhardt expressed con-
cern that fictitious pricing would stop a consumer from continu-
ing to search for a truly lower price, citing a 1992 Dhruv 
Grewal and Larry D. Compeau literature survey as support.213 
In Overstock.com, the court, in ordering the company to comply 
with fictitious-pricing regulation, also gave weight to 1998 and 
2004 analyses by Grewal and Compeau.214 Nonetheless, the 
backdrop of advertising regulation reveals that intervention 
must be done with caution to avoid harming the pro-
competitive effects of advertising. This Article explores that 
backdrop in Subsection 1. In Subsection 2, this Article de-
scribes the rich body of work that makes the fictitious-pricing 
 
 211. Id. at 64. 
 212. See cases cited supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 213. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 
Grewal & Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising, supra note 12, at 55 (rec-
ommending closer policymaker scrutiny of prior-reference pricing practices, 
based on a survey of twenty-eight separate studies of former-price compari-
sons and closely related practices)). 
 214. People v. Overstock.com, Inc., No. RG10546833, 2014 WL 657516, at 
*12–13 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2014). The Overstock.com case is presumably 
referencing Larry D. Compeau & Dhruv Grewal, Comparative Price Advertis-
ing: An Integrative Review, 17 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 257, 257 (1998) 
[hereinafter, Compeau & Grewal, An Integrative Review] (summarizing twenty 
years of analyses, concluding that comparative price advertising is effective, 
“with a strong opportunity for deception, requir[ing] careful management and 
monitoring”), and Larry D. Compeau et al., Consumers’ Interpretations of the 
Semantic Phrases Found in Reference Price Advertisements, 38 J. CONSUMER 
AFF. 178 (2004) (concluding that pricing claims related to regular versus sales 
prices “may be . . . informative or deceptive depending on the meaning that the 
consumer attaches to the claim,” much like other findings in consumer re-
search). 
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arena an exception worthy of consideration for more regulatory 
scrutiny and enforcement. 
1. Concerns About Regulatory Pricing Intervention  
Advertising plays a critical role in signaling and market 
competition. Regulators should be generally reticent to impede 
advertising by correcting every flaw and imperfection. But 
where a deceptive activity is both common and injurious to wel-
fare, the reticence should be eschewed in favor of vigilance. Be-
fore this Article discusses empirical evidence supporting the 
reassessment of regulatory intervention with fictitious pricing, 
this Article first addresses the general concerns about regulato-
ry interference with retail-pricing disclosure. 
Regulators have reason to exercise caution when interven-
ing in regulating or restricting retail-price disclosure.215 As 
Howard Beales et al. observed, mandating the withholding of 
information from the market can “inhibit competition, with 
consequent efficiency losses.”216 According to another analysis, 
“the prices of goods and services in places that restrict advertis-
ing tend to be higher than those in places that do not restrict 
advertising.”217 Beginning in the 1970s, evidence emerged sup-
porting the notion that fewer restrictions on general advertis-
ing leads to lower prices. Deregulation of price disclosure in 
professions, notably optometry, provided an opportunity for 
comparative cross-state studies confirming this conclusion.218 
One other analysis from this era observed the downward im-
pact on pharmaceutical pricing from price advertising.219 More 
recently, studies of the impact of permitting price disclosure on 
 
 215. See generally REBECCA TUSHNET & ERIC GOLDMAN, ADVERTISING & 
MARKETING LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 23–25 (2d ed. 2014); David Adam 
Friedman, Debiasing Advertising: Balancing Risk, Hope, and Social Welfare, 
19 J.L. & POL’Y 539, 608–09 (2011). 
 216. Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Infor-
mation, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 514 (1981).  
 217. Zeynep K. Hansen & Marc T. Law, The Political Economy of Truth-in-
Advertising Regulation During the Progressive Era, 51 J.L. & ECON. 251, 255 
(2008). 
 218. See, e.g., Lee Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eye-
glasses, 15 J.L. & ECON. 337, 351–52 (1972); Lee Benham & Alexandra 
Benham, Regulating Through the Professions: A Perspective on Information 
Control, 18 J.L. & ECON. 421, 427 (1975); John E. Kwoka, Jr., Advertising and 
the Price and Quality of Optometric Services, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 211, 211 
(1984). 
 219. John F. Cady, An Estimate of the Price Effects of Restrictions on Drug 
Price Advertising, 14 ECON. INQUIRY 493, 493 (1976). 
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the price of alcoholic beverages220 and permitting more general 
advertising for breakfast cereals221 have revealed that lower 
prices result.222 
As Beales et al. identified, carving out areas where regula-
tors would be prudent to pursue “information remedies” related 
to deceptive advertising proves challenging in light of the pat-
tern that less regulation seems to translate to more price com-
petition.223 The authors categorize “information remedies” in 
markets as “(a) removing restraints on information; (b) correct-
ing misleading information; and (c) encouraging additional in-
formation.”224 Regulators would face the task of intervention, 
and as Beales and his coauthors observed, “remedying deficien-
cies in the information market is in some ways a more complex 
and subtle task than regulating product markets directly.”225 
With respect to fictitious pricing, regulators face the challenge 
of “correcting misleading information” and “encouraging addi-
tional information,” while not unduly restraining infor-
mation.226 The costs of compliance and risks of penalties should 
not be so burdensome as to prevent price competition. 
Advertisers, however, may have turned a long-accepted ob-
servation about the nature of false advertising inside-out. In 
the 1970s, Phillip Nelson divided offering attributes into 
“search,” “experience,” and “credence” characteristics.227 
“Search” characteristics, (e.g., product size, shape, product cat-
egory, and price) were deemed easier for consumers to verify 
and therefore of less concern for regulators. “Experience” char-
acteristics presented more concern, as they were more difficult 
for consumers to observe and verify, like quality and nature of 
 
 220. Jeffrey Milyo & Joel Waldfogel, The Effect of Price Advertising on 
Prices: Evidence in the Wake of 44 Liquormart, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1081, 1095 
(1999) (discussing that lower prices result in certain circumstances). 
 221. C. Robert Clark, Advertising Restrictions and Competition in the Chil-
dren’s Breakfast Cereal Industry, 50 J.L. & ECON. 757, 759–60 (2007). 
 222. The results, however, are not always unambiguous. See WILLIAM W. 
JACOBS ET AL., FTC, IMPROVING CONSUMER ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES: THE 
CASE FOR REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON TRUTHFUL ADVERTISING 123–27 (1984) 
(finding that while “in almost every case,” attorneys who used advertising 
charged lower prices than attorneys who did not, “personal injury attorneys 
who advertised” charged about 3% more than personal injury attorneys who 
did not).  
 223. Beales et al., supra note 216, at 513. 
 224. Id. at 514. 
 225. Id.  
 226. See Friedman, supra note 215, at 569 n.99. 
 227. See, e.g., Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 
729, 730 (1974); Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. 
POL. ECON. 311, 312 (1970). 
2016] RECONSIDERING FICTITIOUS PRICING 959 
 
the item, until purchased, though consumers might be less like-
ly to give such claims credibility.228  
As Lillian BeVier posited, “incentives to falsify . . . adver-
tisements should be understood as a function either of consum-
ers’ ability to verify claims prepurchase or of consumers’ disin-
clination to believe self-interested claims.”229 BeVier contended 
that consumers had the power to retaliate against deceptive 
advertisers, and that “withhold[ing] repeat purchases” and 
negative word-of-mouth would work as “weapons” to deter dis-
honest advertisement.230 She did not overextend this claim, con-
cluding that “[w]hen this reality is fed into the calculus, the 
dimensions of the problem of deceptive advertising for experi-
ence qualities continue to shrink.”231  
The nature of fictitious pricing does not fit well with the 
Nelson model for two major reasons. First, consumers duped by 
fictitious pricing may not detect the “duping” as readily as they 
might a deficiency in advertised quality. Second, as Roger 
Schechter responded directly to BeVier,232 once induced to try a 
product, consumers tend to continue purchasing a brand “until 
some external source brings [a] falsehood to [their] attention.”233 
Having tried the brand, the consumer “may become ‘hooked’ on 
the objective features of the [product].”234 In other words, adver-
tisers may successfully use falsehoods—or fictitious pricing—to 
induce an initial experience.235 After the initial experience the 
inclination to shop further, on price or other attributes, may 
diminish; the gathering of incremental shopping information 
may appear to the consumer to have decreasing returns. 
Generally, the research into the effects of fictitious pricing 
emphasizes the power of the practice to stop consumer search—
and the accompanying welfare impact. The harms that 
Schechter points out may be real—a misleading practice like 
fictitious pricing could hook a consumer on an item for the long 
term. But the individual harm would prove difficult to meas-
ure. To the extent that all advertising changes preferences, fic-
 
 228. For a discussion of Nelson’s work and subsequent critiques, see Lillian 
R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 9–12 (1992). 
 229. Id. at 8. 
 230. Id. at 11. 
 231. Id. at 12. 
 232. See Roger E. Schechter, Additional Pieces of the Deception Puzzle: 
Some Reactions to Professor BeVier, 78 VA. L. REV. 57, 71 (1991). 
 233. Id. at 72. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
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titious pricing, by inducing a consumer to transact and commit 
to a product, may have the same effect. However, as this Article 
discusses next, the welfare effects of fictitious pricing have con-
sistently been found to be significant. 
2. Evidence Supporting Fictitious-Pricing Intervention 
Price remains a basic search characteristic, but the incen-
tives to manipulate the role of pricing in “search” are high if the 
prior-reference price stunts the search process. Verification of a 
false prior-reference price might prove logistically challeng-
ing—and those who verify and truly seek the lowest price ei-
ther have significant expectations of financial savings from con-
tinued shopping or a low self-imputed value to their time.  
The low likelihood that a consumer will notice individual 
harm from this type of falsity makes fictitious pricing tempting 
for advertisers. Compared with individual consumers, regula-
tors can more readily identify the practice. The charge of the 
FTC, as well as the legal regime in states like California, ena-
bles prosecution of the practice under the notion of a general 
harm to welfare, without worry of proving individual harm. 
One analysis of an adjacent problem proves informative. In 
1990, Ian Ayres and F. Clayton Miller predicted that if auto-
mobile price-markup information became more available and 
accurate, shoppers would not need to shop as much to ensure 
that they were getting the right deal.236 Ayres and Miller ob-
served that accurate disclosure of “[m]arkup information 
[could] . . . serve as a dramatic substitute for consumer 
search.”237 The power of accurate markup information speaks to 
the power of inaccurate markdown information. Fictitious pric-
ing provides a dramatic, misleading substitute for consumer 
search—one less likely to lead the consumer to the lowest price.  
Mark Armstrong and Yongmin Chen provided the most re-
cent economic analysis of discount pricing, including fictitious 
pricing.238 They concluded that, “[b]ecause of their incentive to 
mislead customers, in some . . . situations . . . there is a poten-
tial role for policy to prevent sellers advertising false dis-
counts . . . . In most cases, the overall impact on welfare of a 
 
 236. Ian Ayres & F. Clayton Miller, “I’ll Sell It to You at Cost”: Legal Meth-
ods To Promote Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1048 
(1990). 
 237. Id. 
 238. See generally Armstrong & Cheng, supra note 12 (investigating dis-
count pricing and discussing some reasons why a discounted price can make a 
rational consumer more willing to purchase an item).  
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policy which combats false discounting is positive.”239 
Integrating a description of underlying behavioral con-
cepts,240 Armstrong and Chen identified two ways that dis-
counts (truthful and otherwise), as opposed to the plain presen-
tation of a low price, can drive purchasing propensity among 
rational consumers. “First, the information that the product 
was initially sold at a high price may indicate the product is 
high quality. Second, a discounted price can indicate that the 
product is an unusual bargain, and that there is little point 
searching for alternative, lower prices.”241 As they noted, a ficti-
tious price can prematurely discourage search—the search 
might stop because the pricing signal wrongfully deceived the 
consumer into stopping the search.242 If consumers are tricked 
into ceasing a search for true lower prices, true price competi-
tion will likely be displaced as a means for competing for con-
sumer attention. 
The analysis shows that “false discounts discourage con-
sumers from investigating rival offers[,] . . . depriv[ing] rivals of 
[the] opportunity to compete effectively. In these settings, pre-
venting [fictitious pricing] can lead to more effective competi-
tion.”243 Because honest discounters might have fewer items on 
sale at any given time, dishonest sellers prevail in the market, 
exacerbating the price-competition problem.244 The authors ul-
timately concluded that “[i]n most cases, the overall impact on 
welfare of a policy which combats false discounting is posi-
tive.”245 They prescribed a renewed enforcement policy with 
caution, however, and with less conviction than their analytical 
contribution. Armstrong and Chen conceded that no benefit can 
be realized without some measure of enforcement, but they de-
clined to recommend a required enforcement level.246 
 
 
The authors concluded that: 
Sellers have a strong motive to make their customers feel they are 
getting a special deal, and they have myriad ways to achieve this. It is 
unrealistic and undesirable to suppose that regulation can address all 
forms of false discounting without unduly restricting a seller’s mar-
 
 239. Id. at 25. 
 240. Id. at 1–5. 
 241. Id. at 25. 
 242. Id. at 5. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 25. 
 246. Id. at 25–26. 
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keting abilities, and regulators should focus only on flagrant exam-
ples of deception.247  
This conclusion fits neatly with Pitofsky’s proposed “ex-
treme and egregious” threshold for taking action,248 a threshold 
that appears to exist in theory only.  
Previous studies comported with Armstrong and Chen’s 
conclusions, but they supported the welfare argument with 
more certainty. The 1998 Compeau and Grewal study left “little 
doubt that comparative price advertisements work,” finding 
that “the [overall] potential for deception seem[ed] rife because 
external reference prices have a strong influence on consumers, 
even when they are exaggerated.”249 The 1992 Grewal and 
Compeau meta-analysis remains the most thorough survey of 
the prior-reference-pricing literature, analyzing twenty-eight 
empirical studies.250  
Grewal and Compeau extracted two notable consensus con-
clusions.251 The first set of conclusions showed empirical sup-
port for the notion that a “reference price create[s the] impres-
sion of savings” and that “the presence of a higher reference 
price enhances subjects’ perceived value and willingness to buy 
the product.”252 Further, the evidence demonstrates that “[i]f 
the reference price is not truthful, a consumer may be encour-
aged to purchase as a result of a false sense of value.”253  
The second set of conclusions indicated that “as discount 
size increases, consumers’ perceptions of value and their will-
ingness to buy the product increase, while their intention to 
search for a lower price decreases.”254 This implied that larger 
discounts associated with fictitious pricing “mislead the con-
sumer and reduce search.”255 Grewal and Compeau concluded 
with a compelling set of recommendations to policymakers, 
most of them urging a more aggressive enforcement approach 
toward fictitious pricing.256 
In sum, prior-reference pricing influences consumers, and 
 
 247. Id. at 26. 
 248. See Pitofsky, Pricing Laws, supra note 17, at 62–63. 
 249. Compeau & Grewal, An Integrative Review, supra note 214, at 263. 
 250. Grewal & Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising, supra note 12, at 
55. 
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fictitious prior-reference pricing disrupts retail markets in two 
primary ways. First, the practice misleads consumers with a 
signal that distorts perception of product quality. This signal-
ing can lead to one distorted transaction or, as Schechter indi-
cated,257 a series of transactions following the initial commit-
ment. Second, the practice distorts the very essence of price 
competition. Consumers rely upon a prior-reference price and 
associated discount as a measure of savings. Confronted with 
potential savings, consumers are more likely to stop their 
searching for a better value—whether that value is better qual-
ity, a lower price for the same quality, a different good entirely, 
or ultimately, a decision not to transact. 
The approach taken by regulators in New York and by the 
Superior Court in the California Overstock.com case258 bypasses 
the difficulty in discerning individual consumer harm. Because 
of state statutes, some regulators and courts have found a mid-
dle path in addressing this problem. Bypassing the knot of dis-
cerning consumer harm, as this Article shows in three exam-
ples in Section C, regulators and courts have ultimately favored 
civil fines, penalties, and injunctive relief directed at punishing 
and stopping the market-disrupting, fictitious-pricing behavior. 
Given the difficulties of discerning consumer remedies, this ap-
proach presents the clearest path to resolving this problem—an 
approach that the FTC should restore in measured fashion. 
C. MODELS FOR A WELFARE-ENHANCING APPROACH 
Models for welfare-enhancing enforcement can be found in 
a few high-profile instances of state-level public prosecution. 
State attorneys general259 have pursued a few fictitious-pricing 
cases resulting in settlements that effectively prioritize ad-
dressing broader welfare harm over private, individual harm. 
The remedies in the People v. Overstock.com judicial opinion re-
flect the same pattern.260 These state-level actions offer insight 
into a potential model for enforcement—one where the regula-
tors stop the market-distorting behavior through penalties and 
injunctions, but avoid attempting to impose thornier individual 
remedies. 
 
 257. See Schechter, supra note 232. 
 258. People v. Overstock.com, Inc., No. RG104546833, 2014 WL 657516 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2014). 
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1. State-Level Settlements 
State-level fictitious-pricing regulation, though sporadic, 
has proven successful enough to warrant attention from en-
forcement critics.261 A few recent consent agreements show that 
individual harm has been moved aside in favor of general civil 
penalties and injunctive relief. For example, in 2011, the New 
York Attorney General reached a settlement with Michaels 
Stores, an arts-and-crafts retailer, over fictitious-pricing prac-
tices.262 Michaels Stores had been engaging in “never-ending” 
sales—continuously advertising services at a prior-reference 
percentage (or absolute dollar) discount, meaning that the pri-
or-reference point was not the regular price for those items.263  
New York Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman offered 
a nominal justification for enforcement rooted in rhetoric that 
the company hurt individual consumers by roping them into 
perceived deals: “For years, Michaels duped consumers into 
thinking they were receiving huge discounts, when in fact, they 
were simply paying the regular store price . . . . Through decep-
tive advertising practices, this company violated the law and 
took advantage of hardworking consumers trying to save mon-
ey.”264 The New York Attorney General, however, did not ulti-
mately require redress for individual harm or any form of resti-
tution. Instead, the parties agreed that Michaels would pay 
$800,000 in civil penalties and give $1 million worth of arts-
and-crafts supplies to public schools.265 In essence, the penalty 
was punitive (and perhaps politically agreeable for both par-
ties) but not restorative to consumers. Also, the agreement en-
joined Michaels from continuing to engage in fictitious prior-
reference pricing and related practices.266 
Likewise, in 2004, Schneiderman’s predecessor Eliot 
Spitzer reached an agreement with Jos. A. Bank Clothiers 
(JABC) over fictitious pricing.267 The settlement references alle-
gations that, in 2003, less than one percent of JABC’s suits, 
formal wear, trousers, and blazers were offered at the regular 
 
 261. See Pitofsky, Pricing Laws, supra note 17, at 64–65. 
 262. See Assurance of Discontinuance, Michaels, supra note 16. 
 263. Id. at 2–3. 
 264. Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney Gen., N.Y., A.G. 
Schneiderman Secures $1.8 Million from Michaels Stores for Misleading Con-
sumers (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman 
-secures-18-million-michaels-stores-misleading-consumers. 
 265. Assurance of Discontinuance, Michaels, supra note 16.  
 266. Id. at 5–7. 
 267. See Assurance of Discontinuance, Jos. A. Bank, supra note 16. 
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price, and only ten percent of dress shirts.268 The Attorney Gen-
eral further alleged that merchandise was “perpetually ‘on 
sale,’” noting that JABC’s three best-selling items, the Signa-
ture, Executive, and Trio suits were on sale during all of 2003 
with the exception of a few days.269 
This settlement required JABC to pay $425,000 in civil 
penalties and $50,000 in costs to New York State.270 More oner-
ous than the one-time civil penalty, JABC agreed to comply not 
only with New York’s false advertising laws, but also with the 
FTC Guides—16 C.F.R. § 233.1 (former price comparisons) and 
with all of 16 C.F.R. § 233 (deceptive pricing).271 Ironically, New 
York State compelled JABC to comply with FTC Guides that 
the FTC does not enforce.  
In both of these settlements, New York modeled potential 
future enforcement actions. Foremost, the state stopped the re-
tailers from engaging in a market-distortive practice that 
stunts consumer shopping, causes misperceptions of value, and 
ultimately reduces welfare. The retailers paid a public penalty 
for untoward market behavior that affected overall welfare, 
and state avoided intellectual contortions by eschewing the in-
dividual remedy.  
2. A Judicial Approach 
“No one, in history, has ever been asked to do this or [was] 
sued for not doing it.”272 
- Patrick Byrne, CEO of Overstock, demonstrating 
unawareness of past and recent history,273 subsequent to 
a ruling ordering the company to comply with California 
discounting regulations. 
 
The reasoning of People v. Overstock.com provides an over-
lay for policymakers and those with discretion to bring ficti-
tious-pricing cases. In Overstock.com, the People’s complaint af-
 
 268. Id. at 2. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 6. 
 271. Id. at 5. 
 272. Cade Metz, Court Decision Could Change Rules for Online Price Com-
parisons, WIRED (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/01/overstock-price 
-ruling. 
 273. See supra text accompanying note 15 (listing active actions as of De-
cember 2014); see also Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(finding for plaintiffs in a case very similar to Overstock.com); supra Part 
III.C.2 (discussing the New York State Attorney General settlement decrees 
with JAB and Michaels). 
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forded an opportunity for a California Superior Court to ex-
pound upon the various elements of a fictitious-pricing action 
and explore appropriate remedies and sanctions. This case re-
veals a compelling logic for why private actions fail, and why 
public actions, appropriately reined in, provide the best avenue 
for addressing welfare damage from fictitious pricing. 
The remedy imposed by a California court in Overstock.com 
offers guidance for how today’s FTC enforcement regime should 
work. The Overstock.com case ultimately did not squarely turn 
on an “internal” prior-reference advertising claim;274 the case 
turned on Overstock allegedly creating false list prices for the 
purpose of discounting.275 The court found that the company 
based list prices off estimates from formulas or off the prices of 
different items.276 “Every time Overstock displayed a list price 
based on a formula or a similar product rather than [the manu-
facturer’s established list price] it made an untrue state-
ment.”277 
The eight California district attorneys278 prosecuting this 
case alleged that Overstock traded on false representations of 
discounting practices.279 Broadly, the court focused on Over-
stock’s practice of labeling and displaying “advertised reference 
prices” (ARPs) as “intend[ing] to convey to consumers that 
Overstock was a discounter and [that] very substantial savings 
could be enjoyed by purchasing from its site.”280 Of concern to 
the People, in light of literature’s consensus about the competi-
tive harm from search stunting, was Overstock’s claim: “[W]e 
compare prices so you don’t have to.”281 Ironically, the court 
found that “compare” labels were not false, per se, because they 
merely called on the consumer “to do something.”282  
Examining that slogan in conjunction with the false list 
 
 274. See People v. Overstock.com, Inc., No. RG104546833, 2014 WL 
657516, at *32–33 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2014).  
 275. Id. at *27. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. See id. at *1. In California, district attorneys and city attorneys can 
play a role in enforcement. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17508, subd. (b) 
(West 2015). For other notable examples, see California v. Southdale Kay-Bee 
Toy, Inc., No. 26-15784, 2003 WL 25284541 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2003); 
Goetting, supra note 155. 
 279. Overstock.com, 2014 WL 657516, at *1 (“At the beginning, most if not 
all of Overstock’s offerings were products from manufacturers, retailers or job-
bers who were liquidating excess or outdated inventory . . . .”).  
 280. Id. at *3. 
 281. Id. at *2. 
 282. Id. at *27. 
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prices, however, the advertiser appeared to count on some de-
gree of search stunting, emphasizing that the consumer should 
be confident in believing that pricing had been thoroughly vet-
ted. Generally, “the People contend[ed] [that] Overstock used 
labels, formats[,] and practices that resulted in advertising 
[methods] that [were] often false or at least misleading” under 
California statutes, rendering them actionable.283 
The court’s remedy analysis confronted Overstock with 
significant sanctions and penalties that would, if upheld, lead 
to changes in the company’s marketing practices. In enjoining 
fictitious-pricing behavior and levying penalties while declining 
to award individual relief, the outcome of Overstock.com re-
sembled the two resolutions reached by the New York State At-
torney General.284 
Foremost, the injunctive relief granted to the People was 
significant in scope.285 This flavor of injunctive relief echoes the 
remedies sought by the FTC prior to 1969. For example, Over-
stock was prohibited from “set[ting] . . . ARP[s] on any basis 
other than an actual price offered in the marketplace at . . . the 
time the advertisement is first placed.”286 Also, Overstock could 
no longer select “the highest price that may be found any-
where” as a reference price, unless Overstock disclosed the con-
text of the discount.287  
The People unsuccessfully prayed for restitution for indi-
vidual consumers misled by the deceptive pricing. The People 
contended that “restitution should be the money that ‘may have 
been acquired’ by the false advertising.”288 Specifically, the 
plaintiffs suggested that all California consumers who pur-
chased items from Overstock over the previous ten years should 
be given the choice to return the item for a refund or receive a 
“5% credit towards future purchases.”289  
The Overstock.com court viewed the pursuit of individual 
restitution as “wildly excessive” and “unjustified.”290 Evidence 
failed to support a claim that all Overstock purchasers were de-
ceived.291 The People failed to present credible evidence about 
 
 283. Id. at *3. 
 284. See supra Part III.C.  
 285. See Overstock.com, 2014 WL 657516, at *34–36. 
 286. Id. at *35. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at *36. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
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pecuniary harm, and the court found the five-percent credit ar-
bitrary.292 The court concluded that the extensive record in the 
case did not offer a “reasonable metric . . . [or] methodology” for 
determining restitution and “identifying . . . who should receive 
it.”293 This struggle with remedy and injury echoes that of the 
private actions brought in Illinois, discussed earlier. Regulators 
should take a cue from this opinion and the New York settle-
ments and avoid the thicket of individual remedy—and instead 
focus on stopping the general social harm. The Overstock.com 
court focused on the latter.  
The court acknowledged that “the most powerful evi-
dence . . . [was] that there was a reduction in search intentions, 
an increase in a perception of transaction value and a greater 
likelihood that the consumers would return to [Overstock].”294 
Recognizing market distortion, the court turned next to civil 
penalties.295  
The court evaluated the “seriousness of [Overstock’s] mis-
conduct” as “moderate.”296 But considering willfulness297 and 
Overstock’s financial strength, the court imposed a $6,828,000 
penalty.298 The court deemed this amount “the minimum neces-
sary to vindicate the purposes of the statutes.”299 In “vindicat-
ing” the statutes—while avoiding the thicket of individual 
harm—the court attempted to preserve the integrity of signals 
in the marketplace.  
Even if higher courts alter this ruling, or if this matter 
reaches a settlement during the appellate process, the logic of 
the Overstock.com opinion has appeal particularly with respect 
to remedies. The Overstock.com tack could easily apply to prior-
reference pricing, just as it did for external comparative refer-
ence pricing. The individual harms inflicted are difficult to 
identify, but fictitious-pricing behavior can be spotted more 
easily by regulators who track pricing than by individual con-
sumers. The social harm can be addressed by civil penalties 
which serve as a deterrent, if not a true recovery mechanism. 
Future market distortion can be prevented with injunctive or-
ders like the one in Overstock.com or stipulated agreements 
 
 292. See id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. Compeau presented this evidence as an expert at trial. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at *38. 
 297. Id. at *39. 
 298. Id. at *38–39. 
 299. Id. at *39. 
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like those reached by the New York Attorney General in JABC 
and Michaels Stores. The focus of enforcement should rest on 
pinpointing social harms (like those identified in the litera-
ture), penalizing the infliction of harm, and preventing future 
harm—while staying out of the minefield of proving individual 
pecuniary harm. 
Overstock attempted to mislead consumers and interfere 
with consumer decision making by manipulating price advertis-
ing. As Judge Easterbrook wrote in B. Sanfield, an attorney 
general would have been able to make a case about deception in 
“a trice,” though the plaintiff in that case could not masquerade 
as a private attorney general in search of damages that could 
not be proven.300 Here, Judge Easterbrook’s public attorney 
general materialized. The California approach, extending from 
private actions in Kwikset to Hinojos to the public action in 
Overstock.com, should serve as models for enforcement of ficti-
tious pricing.301 In Part IV, this Article suggests that the FTC 
should revisit fictitious pricing, and this Article provides cate-
gorical examples of where the FTC might exercise discretion in 
enforcement. 
IV.  THE CASE FOR REVISITING ENFORCEMENT   
The time for reassessing the viability of enforcement has 
arrived, especially given the FTC’s plans for review of the 
Guides Against Deceptive Pricing in 2017.302 The welfare bene-
fits of fictitious-pricing enforcement should outweigh the costs, 
including costs of incremental enforcement, regulatory oppor-
tunity costs, and retailer compliance costs. Though the role of 
cost-benefit analysis is not entirely uniform across zones of 
regulation,303 the FTC has effectively adopted this approach, 
which this Article describes next in Section A. In Section B, this 
Article describes the temporal context of the original justifica-
 
 300. B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 258 F.3d 578, 580 (7th 
Cir. 2001). 
 301. Though Pitofsky disfavors all enforcement, this Article agrees with 
him that if enforcement is left only to states, the patchwork of regulation and 
varied compliance requirements could be messy. Institutionally, the FTC 
might be best positioned to address practices of regional and national retail-
ers. 
 302. See Modified 10-Year Regulatory Review Schedule, 79 Fed. Reg. 
14199, 14200 (Mar. 13, 2014). 
 303. The consensus about applying cost-benefit analysis varies across regu-
latory subject matter. See Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Analysis 
for Financial Regulation, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393 (2013). See generally 
MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS (2006) (giving an overview the history of cost-benefit analysis). 
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tion for nonenforcement and present the changes in retail mar-
kets since that time. The promotion of price competition by pro-
tecting “discounters” may have been paramount in 1977, but 
the structure of the industry is quite different today. In Section 
C, this Article offers some potential frameworks that the FTC 
could use for prioritizing opportunities for enforcement while 
recognizing the potential costs of enforcement. 
A. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND FTC POLICY 
Understanding the FTC approach toward enforcing ficti-
tious pricing requires context about enforcement of unfair and 
deceptive practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act.304 The FTC 
Act declares unlawful, “[u]nfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
or affecting commerce.”305 Though advertising practices can be 
regulated either through “unfairness” or “deception,” the FTC 
has prosecuted most advertising cases through the “deception” 
standard.306  
The FTC’s application of “deception” proves central to un-
derstanding the approach to all federal advertising regulation, 
“deceptive pricing” included.307 In 1983, a divided FTC adopted 
the “Policy Statement on Deception”308 in response to a 
congressional inquiry. The 1983 Policy Statement listed three 
elements that “undergird all deception cases.”309 First, “there 
 
 304. For a brief overview, see Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Remarks at the Economics of Digital Consumer Protection: One 
Commissioner’s View 3–7 (July 31, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/public_statements/573061/010731techfreedom.pdf.  
 305. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 306. Though the “disjunctive phrase ‘unfair or deceptive’ suggests that the 
FTC can pursue advertisers on unfairness per se, the FTC has not taken that 
path, opting for the deception angle.” SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 44; see also 
PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 44 (providing an overview of the FTC’s ap-
plication of the deception standard to deceptive pricing (including bait and 
switch) as well as unsubstantiated advertising claims, visual deception, un-
founded testimonials and endorsements, misleading comparative advertising, 
deceptive claims for tobacco products, misleading environmental advertising, 
and deceptive “made in the U.S.A.” claims). The FTC also prosecutes deceptive 
pricing under Section 12 of the FTC Act, but this section is targeted at adver-
tising of food, drugs, devices, services, and cosmetics. 15 U.S.C. § 52(a)(2) 
(2012).  
 307. Cf. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 44, §§ 11:1–5 (explaining the 
role of “deception” in some FTC prosecutions). 
 308. FTC Policy Statement on Deception, James C. Miller III, Chairman, 
Fed. Trade Comm’n (Oct. 14, 1983) (appended to Cliffdale Associates, 103 
F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984)). 
 309. Id. 
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must be a representation, omission or practice that is likely to 
mislead the consumer.” Such practices have been found to in-
clude “misleading price claims.”310 Second, the practice at issue 
must be examined from the standpoint of a “consumer acting 
reasonably in the circumstances,” and third, the “representa-
tion, practice, or omission” at issue in the first prong must be 
“material.”311 If it is likely that the consumer would have “cho-
sen differently but for the deception,” “consumer injury” is like-
ly, and materiality is established.312 In some cases, materiality 
can be presumed, though other cases may require presentation 
of evidence.313 
This deception standard can reach fictitious pricing if the 
FTC chooses to apply it. False information that misleads a rea-
sonably acting consumer into making a different transactional 
decision would constitute “deception.” Materiality, however, 
may not be “presumed” in the case of deceptive pricing because 
it does not fit into specific presumptive categories defined by 
the 1983 Policy Statement.314 Nonetheless, materiality can still 
be proven with evidence “that the claim or omission is likely to 
be considered important by consumers.” A showing “that the 
product . . . with the feature represented costs more than an 
otherwise comparable product without the feature, a reliable 
survey of consumers, or credible testimony” can serve as the 
required evidence.315 The Policy Statement concludes: 
A finding of materiality is also a finding that injury is likely to exist 
because of the representation, omission, sales practice, or marketing 
technique. Injury to consumers can take many forms. Injury exists if 
consumers would have chosen differently but for the deception. If dif-
ferent choices are likely, the claim is material, and injury is likely as 
well. Thus, injury and materiality are different names for the same 
concept.316 
This last catch-all paragraph, combined with the express 
mention of “misleading price claims,” captures the notion that 
fictitious pricing would lead to material injury under these 
standards. The FTC can choose to bring a case under the prem-
 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Among the “presumptively material” categories are claims generally 
related to non-price attributes of the offering. See id. Also considered material 
are claims involving health and safety and claims concerning the purpose, 
safety, efficacy, cost, durability, performance, warranties, or quality of the of-
fering. Id. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. (emphasis added). 
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ise that a deception that leads consumers to different choices 
equates to a “likely” injury. Courts typically require consumer 
plaintiffs to prove actual harm. 
The FTC certainly would be within the bounds of statutory 
authority and its own policy statements and guides, were it to 
proceed with renewed enforcement.  
B. CHANGING RETAIL MARKETS 
The fundamental assumptions underlying the cost-benefit 
decision to discontinue enforcement should be revisited. 
Pitofsky argued that shielding retail discounters from enforce-
ment would free them to offer competitive prices and discounts 
without worry of regulatory harassment.317 However, dis-
counters thrived during the era of post-war enforcement,318 
which would indicate that they never really required protection. 
Any notion that discounters were healthy during enforcement 
alleviates concerns that enforcement would undermine their 
role in price competition. Even if this concern about discounters 
was well founded in 1969, retailing has changed so drastically 
since then, that these changes should, at minimum, warrant 
reassessment of the cost-benefit analysis of enforcement. 
1. Post-World-War-II Retail Dynamic 
In 1962, prominent industry lawyer Carleton Harkrader 
observed that in spite of aggressive fictitious-pricing enforce-
ment, discount retailers flourished after World War II, grab-
bing market share from traditional retailers like urban down-
town department stores.320 Ascribing the peak of enforcement to 
the emergence of a “retail revolution” of discounters, 
Harkrader321 described an environment in which they thrived.322 
Before World War II, department stores dominated their terri-
 
 317. See Pitofsky, Pricing Laws, supra note 17, at 63–64. 
 318. See Harkrader, supra note 13, at 4–5. 
 320. See id. at 4–6. Harkrader served as an attorney for the FTC before 
founding a prominent Washington, D.C. law firm in 1960. See T. Rees Shapiro, 
Robert L. Wald, Antitrust Lawyer Helped Found Fast-Growing District Firm, 
Dies, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2010, at B4. 
 321. In his article, the only contemporaneous academic account of fictitious 
pricing, Harkrader expressed concerns that one might attribute to an attorney 
tied into the established retail and manufacturer industry. He argued that the 
1958 Guides provided a “rough,” but “traversable,” road for retailers but ex-
pressed special concern for manufacturers who used pre-ticketed prices bear-
ing exposure from retailers who would lower those prices. Harkrader, supra 
note 13, at 27–28. 
 322. Id. at 4–6. 
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tory. Department stores would typically mark up their mer-
chandise at a standard forty percent above the wholesale price, 
reflecting the manufacturers’ suggested retail price (MSRP), of-
fering different tiers of quality for each product category.323 In 
this era, department stores provided higher levels of customer 
service and competed with each other on service more than 
price.324  
In the 1950s, a “new brand of merchandiser” arrived and 
thrived—discounters,325 the entities that regulators would later 
seek to protect from fictitious-pricing enforcement.326 These new 
merchandisers “dispensed with expensive frills associated with 
the traditional department store[s],” emphasizing a “low-
markup, high-volume, quick-turnover” approach.327 The emer-
gence of discounters brought “unprecedented competition,” de-
ploying a new business model that disrupted the establish-
ment. Discounters emerged to serve a growing segment of post-
war consumers that valued low prices over service.328  
By minimizing operating expenses, discounters could af-
ford to cut the forty-percent manufacturer markup in half and 
remain profitable.329 Discounters enjoyed a relative cost ad-
vantage through implementation of self-service, moving to sub-
urbs where the post-war consumers had migrated, and where 
commercial real estate was less expensive and parking abun-
dant.330 In 1962, these new stores were occupying “buildings 
that were often little more than warehouses.”331 This lower cost 
structure enabled discounters to gain market share from de-
partment stores in part through “flamboyant” low-price adver-
tising.332  
In 1962, discounters certainly did not seem to need much 
protection from competitors seeking regulatory help. They 
transformed the landscape. Many established department 
stores would fail as a result of these new players entering the 
 
 323. See id. at 4. 
 324. See id. 
 325. Id. at 4–5. 
 326. See generally Muris, supra note 19 (detailing Robert Pitofsky’s contri-
butions to FTC regulations and consumer welfare); Pitofsky, Pricing Laws, su-
pra note 17 (examining the history of FTC fictitious pricing regulations). 
 327. Harkrader, supra note 13, at 4. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. at 5. 
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scene.333 Other incumbents modified their formats or strategi-
cally played the discount game, lowering prices on select items. 
Thus began a “chain reaction of extravagant pricing claims by 
both kinds of merchants, often abetted by inflated [MSRPs].”334 
These price battles went beyond plain offering or declaration of 
lower prices, they involved referencing competitor prices.335  
With discounters flexing their structural pricing ad-
vantage, the incumbent, legacy retailers changed tactics. De-
partment stores could not favorably compare their prices to the 
discounters through direct comparison, so they pursued a dif-
ferent angle. According to Harkrader, the department stores—
not discounters—initiated the practice of advertising selected 
sales that referenced a prior price or the MSRP.336 After de-
partment stores entered the discounting game, on many items, 
the discounters had more difficulty winning through price com-
parison.337 Discounters responded by referencing their discounts 
off the MSRP, too.338 Retailers of all stripes were compelled to 
operate comparatively whether they preferred to or not. Prior-
reference discount pricing followed.339 The entry of discounters 
transformed sleepy pre-war retail competition into the modern 
era of perpetual discount-based competition. Discounters, even 
in the early post-war era, did not merely enter and survive—
they sparked changes that led to the retail world of today. 
After a decade, pricing presentation became indistinguish-
able between department stores and discount stores,340 “[i]n the 
fierce competitive in-fighting for the consumer dollar, fictitious 
pricing has become a common vice of the [marketplace].”341 
Harkrader claimed that this dynamic left consumers “confused, 
critical and skeptical,”342 contending that this sentiment drove 
the “agitation” for regulatory intervention and reform, culmi-
nating with promulgation of the 1958 version of the Guides.343 
 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. at 27. 
 342. Id. at 6. For support, Harkrader cited an article in the popular nation-
al press, Phony Price-Cutting: Threat to Advertising Confidence, TIME, Nov. 
10, 1958, at 78, that in turn cited a Duquesne University study about consum-
er suspicions about discounting. Harkrader, supra note 13, at 6 n.18. 
 343. Harkrader, supra note 13, at 6. 
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2. Post-1969 Retail Dynamic 
The American retail sector transformed substantially since 
the late 1960s,344 a factor ignored by Pitofsky and other en-
forcement critics. Focusing on just the largest industry players 
does not tell the entire story of retail history, but changes at 
the top can indicate significant changes in competition and in-
dustry structure. From 1970 through 1985, the leaders in the 
non-supermarket, non-drugstore, retail sector345 remained fairly 
stable. In 1970, Sears-Roebuck held the position of largest re-
tailer, followed by J.C. Penney, Montgomery Ward, Kmart, 
F.W. Woolworth, and Federated Department Stores.346 In 1975 
and 1980, demonstrating remarkable stability, all of these enti-
ties remained on the list of the five largest retailers, except for 
Montgomery Ward.347 
By the mid-1980s, the same players more or less held 
ground, but this would change. From the list of top 1985 dis-
counters, only Walmart survived intact in 2014.348 These “origi-
 
 344. For a discussion and illustration of these changes, see KPMG, THE 
EVOLUTION OF RETAILING: REINVENTING THE CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE 1, 6–8 
(2009), https://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/ 
Documents/Evolution-retailing-o-200912.pdf.  
 345. Though supermarkets and drugstores comprise a significant part of 
retail, this Article wishes to focus this analysis on changes in purchasing that 
tend to be more discretionary. 
 346. See The 50 Largest Retailing Companies, FORTUNE, May 1971, at 196. 
 347. See The 50 Largest Retailing Companies, FORTUNE, July 1976, at 210; 
The 50 Largest Retailing Companies, FORTUNE, July 1981, at 122.  
 348. See Kapner, supra note 7; Wenti Xu, The Market Structure of the U.S. 
Retail Industry 1984–2003, at 116 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Purdue University). “Kmart” as it is known today, has been through 
merger and restructuring. See Kmart History: Retailing Legend Is Born, SEARS 
HOLDINGS, http://searsholdings.com/about/kmart/kmart-history (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2015). Woolworth closed its last U.S. stores in 1997. “Woolworth was 
100 years ago what Walmart is today.” Jennifer Steinhauer, Woolworth Gives 
up on the Five-and-Dime, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1997, at A1. As part of its 1990 
emergence from bankruptcy, Ames Department Stores shut down the last re-
maining Zayres stores. Stanley Ziemba, Ames Cuts To Wipe Out Ex-Zayres, 
CHI. TRIB. (June 9, 1999), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1990-06-09/news/ 
9002170054_1_ames-department-stores-zayre-ames-shoppers. Ames itself 
would completely succumb in 2002. Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, Ames Discount 
Chain To Close, CBS NEWS (Aug. 14, 2002), http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
news/ames-discount-chain-to-close. Rapid American spun off Lerner Stores to 
The Limited in 1985, and its other stores, McCrory and J.J. Newberry would 
all shut down. See Amy Worden, Cashing out Last of Five-and-Dimes 
McCrory’s Will Shut Its Doors Next Week in Harrisburg, as the Lone Remain-
ing Original Variety-Store Chain Fades away, PHILA. INQUIRER  
(Mar. 13, 2002), http://articles.philly.com/2002-03-13/news/25341228_1_ 
mccrory-buxbaum-group-paul-buxbaum; Nancy Yoshishara, Rapid American 
Agrees To Sell 796 Stores: Limited Plans To Buy Lerner Chain, L.A. TIMES 
(Feb. 5, 1985), http://articles.latimes.com/1985-02-05/business/fi-4964_1_ 
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nal” discounters fell victim to the “category killers” (or “big-box” 
retailers) arriving next, providing low pricing and superior 
merchandising through a narrower focus around product cate-
gory. Broad-merchandising discounters like Sears and Kmart 
faced aggressive price competition from focused retailers like 
Toys “R” Us, the Home Depot, Barnes & Noble, Staples, the 
Sports Authority, Petco, and Best Buy. Warehouse clubs, like 
Costco, Price Club, and Sam’s Club (Walmart’s preemptive 
move into the warehouse arena), also began to chip away, not 
only at supermarkets but other retailers.349  
By 2011, these second-wave discounters, the “category kill-
ers,” found themselves in an accelerating competitive struggle 
with online competition, that some predict might end in a “tsu-
nami wave.”350 After years of riding out (and joining in) online 
disruption of brick-and-mortar retail markets, the pre-2008 re-
cession investment in physical locations by incumbent retailers 
put them at a significant cost and flexibility disadvantage to 
pure online retailers.351 Book stores, electronic stores, and of-
fice-supply retailers all absorbed hits from online retailers.352  
By 2012, the top grossing non-supermarket, non-drug re-
tailers in the United States were Walmart, Target,353 Costco, 
 
mccrory. Shoe Corporation of America (SCOA) eventually merged with Hills 
Department Stores. Both entities are now defunct. See Isadore Barmash, Hills 
Department Stores Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1991, 
at D2; Company Overview of Shoe Corporation of America, Inc., BLOOMBERG, 
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2015). Rose’s Stores, a regional chain of over 100 stores, was 
purchased in a restructuring by Variety Wholesalers Incorporated. About Us: 
About Variety Wholesalers, VARIETY WHOLESALERS INC., http://www.vwstores 
.com/page/show/id/6528 (last visited Nov. 24, 2015). 
 349. ROBERT SPECTOR, CATEGORY KILLERS: THE RETAIL REVOLUTION AND 
ITS IMPACT ON CONSUMER CULTURE 31–51 (2005). 
 350. Rajiv Lal & Jose B. Alvarez, Retailing Revolution: Category Killers on 
the Brink, HARV. BUS. SCH. (Oct. 10, 2011), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6813 
.html.  
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
 353. This Article includes Walmart (which includes Sam’s Club), even 
though 55% of Walmart’s United States sales originate in grocery (Walmart is 
America’s largest grocer). See WALMART, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2013), 
http://stock.walmart.com/files/doc_financials/2013/Annual/2013-annual-report 
-for-walmart-stores-inc_130221024708579502.pdf. The remaining non-grocery 
segment of Walmart’s business is large enough that any discussion of the 
American retail landscape must include it. This Article includes Target be-
cause only 20% of its 2012 sales were attributable to groceries and pet sup-
plies. Approximately 55% of sales were attributable to apparel, hardlines 
(electronics included), and home furnishings. See TARGET, 2013 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 64 (2013), https://corporate.target.com/annual-reports/pdf-viewer-2013? 
cover=6725&parts=6724-6726-6727-6730-6728. 
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the Home Depot, Lowe’s, Amazon.com, Best Buy, Sears, Macy’s, 
and Apple Stores/iTunes.354 Pitofsky offered his rationale for 
discontinuing enforcement in 1977. In 1977, with the exception 
of restructured versions of Sears and Macy’s, these top 2012 re-
tailers had low national profiles,355 or were beyond conception, 
let alone at the top of any list.356 By one account, the “tradition-
al department store” had completely collapsed as an institution 
by 2013.357  
 
 354. See David P. Schulz, Top 100 Retailers, STORES MAG., July 2013. Note 
that these stores mostly fall into big-box, discount, or online categories. Su-
permarkets and drugstores have proliferated on the larger list, as well. 
 355. In 1977, net Walmart sales were $479 million in 153 stores. Eric 
Francis, Walmart at 50: A Not-So-Short History of the World’s Largest Retail-
er, ARK. BUS., July 2, 2012, at 12. By 2012, domestic Walmart sales were $328 
billion. Schulz, supra note 354, at S7. In 1979, the Target store brand only ex-
isted in seventy-four stores in eleven states. Target Through the Years: 1979, 
TARGET, https://corporate.target.com/about/history/Target-through-the-years 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2015). Costco, an enormous warehouse discounter, 
opened its doors under the name Price Club in 1976, and the first Costco la-
beled warehouse opened in 1983. Costco grew to $3 billion in sales in six years, 
claiming a retail record. About Us, COSTCO, http://www.costco.com/about.html 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2015). The Home Depot was founded in 1978. See Our 
History, HOME DEPOT, https://corporate.homedepot.com/ourcompany/history/ 
pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 24, 2015). 
 356. Although this Article has excluded food and drugstore chains from the 
basic analysis, many, like Kroger, Walgreen, and CVS Caremark have also 
emerged at the top of the overall list. See Schulz, supra note 354, at S7. 
 357. See Joe Weisenthal, You Might Not Have Realized Just How Much the 
“Department Store” Has Collapsed, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www 
.businessinsider.com/department-store-decline-2013-8. Indeed, department 
store sales have steadily declined 29% from their most recent peak in January 
2001 to February 2014. See Retail Trade: Department Stores (Excluding 
Leased Departments), FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS ECON. RES. (Oct. 14, 
2015), http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/RSDSELD. In 1977, Pitofsky 
expressed concern that “the usual complainants [about discounting practices] 
have been nondiscounters who emphasize service and reliability rather than 
price” at the expense of discounters who promote competition. Pitofsky, Be-
yond Nader, supra note 20, at 688. The steep sales decline reveals traditional 
players in the department store industry no longer have the same market 
share or power. As this Article discusses infra, electronic retailing and algo-
rithmic discounting are playing an increasing and still growing role in the re-
tail sphere, though smaller than one might expect. The share of e-commerce 
retail sales as a percentage of total sales rose from 0.6% at the end of 1999 to 
6% at the end of 2013, seasonally adjusted. See E-Commerce Retail Sales as a 
Percent of Total Sales, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS ECON. RES. (Aug. 17, 
2015), http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/ECOMPCTSA. Nonstore retail 
sales grew at a compound annual rate of 9% between 1992 and 2013. See Re-
tail Trade: Nonstore Retailers, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS ECON. RES. 
(Oct. 14, 2015), http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/RSNSR. Discount 
department stores grew at a compound annual rate or 1% between 1992 and 
2013, while supercenters and warehouse stores categorized as general mer-
chandise stores grew at 13%. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MONTHLY RETAIL 
TRADE REPORT (2015), http://www.census.gov/retail/index.html (click on the 
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The methods and metrics for assessing change in the retail 
sector can be debated and challenged, as can the causes of suc-
cess and failure for different retailers and different types of re-
tailers. However, a few developments since 1969 are apparent. 
The original discounters emerged, the category killers followed, 
e-commerce arrived. Some traditional retailers survived, some 
discounters survived, and some electronic retailers have per-
formed better than others. Over the years, this has added up to 
remarkable competitive change at many stages—and the face 
of retailing today looks quite different than 1969. 
In retrospect, Pitofsky’s 1977 position could be viewed two 
ways in light of the evolution of retail markets. These trans-
formations that have seemingly served consumers well have 
unfolded in an environment unfettered by federal fictitious 
pricing enforcement. However, the initial emergence and early 
success of discounters coincided with the height of enforcement, 
so separating out the effects of non-enforcement proves diffi-
cult, if not impossible—especially given other massive economic 
factors. Nonetheless, the stark changes in the retail industry 
alone justify a revisit of the FTC’s nearly fifty-year old stance. 
3. Recent Developments 
Though inexpensive technology now offers real-time tools 
to facilitate consumer price comparison, the impact of this in-
novation might be overstated. Some consumers shop increas-
ingly with mobile or internet price comparison technology, but 
many do not.358 The Internet’s promise of price transparency 
has not been realized. In light of the notion that the Internet 
has been perceived as the consumer’s “best friend,” the appar-
ent “explosion of less-than-stellar deals advertised on the 
 
link entitled “Excel (1992-present)” next to the “Retail and Food Services 
Sales” statement under the “Monthly Retail Trade Report” header to download 
an Excel spreadsheet of the data from which these numbers were calculated).  
 358. Survey data tend to vary, but though they show shifts toward technol-
ogy-driven price shopping, not all consumers claim to shop that way. In 2013, 
only half of American adults had a smartphone rendering access to in-store 
comparisons. AARON SMITH, PEW RES. CTR., SMARTPHONE  
OWNERSHIP 2013 (2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/06/05/smartphone 
-ownership-2013. According to one 2012 private study, of those visiting mobile 
retail sites, 19% indicated that “looking up price information” was their “pri-
mary task.” FORESEE, FORESEE MOBILE SATISFACTION INDEX: RETAIL EDITION 
1, 10 (2012), http://www.foresee.com/assets/foresee-mobile-index-retail-edition 
.pdf. Of course, these data are in flux. As the Overstock.com case indicates, the 
Internet might not enable people to escape deceptive-pricing traps. Also, it 
remains unclear whether a mobile device would yield useful comparative in-
formation to a consumer shopping at an outlet mall, for example. 
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web . . . is a bit surprising” for some, given the widespread an-
ticipation that it would “liberate [consumers] from price gim-
micks.”359  
Though the web and associated mobility tools offer more 
avenues for price comparison, advertised discount deals still 
proliferate,360 and the lowest final price might not always pre-
vail. Even though price comparison technology can lower 
search costs, time remains scarce, leaving room for suboptimal 
deals.361 Not to be forgotten, brick-and-mortar retail continues 
to adapt quickly.362 For example, the aforementioned “outlet” or 
“factory outlet” format for retail clothing distribution has grown 
at the expense of other formats.363 Since World War II, the en-
tirety of the retail sector has continuously evolved.364 
Though making conclusions about the role of fictitious pric-
ing in these contexts may require more study, it is incontrovert-
ible that the changes in retail over the past forty years have 
been dramatic. These changes in competition might have shift-
ed the optimal amount of enforcement away from none, given 
that competition has proven quite robust. Because the litera-
ture supports the conclusion that fictitious pricing harms wel-
fare, and that discounting has proliferated, this Article con-
tends that at the very least, this justifies experimentation with 
 
 359. Manjoo, supra note 28. As author William Poundstone noted, though 
many predicted, “the Internet was going to usher in a golden age for consum-
ers, where everyone would start comparison-shopping . . . . [B]ut we are all 
busy, distracted, and we have limited time and attention to devote to research, 
so we all fall victim to these tricks.” Id. 
 360. They proliferate even on transparent Internet sites. For example, 
Barnes & Noble’s website displays David Lat’s novel, Supreme Ambitions, at a 
regular or manufacturers’ price of $22.95, with a discount of 30% and a price 
of $16.02. See Supreme Ambitions: A Novel, BARNES & NOBLE, http://www 
.barnesandnoble.com/w/supreme-ambitions-david-lat/1119652044 (as of Dec. 
27, 2014). If the Barnes & Noble’s discount prevented further searching, Ama-
zon’s price of $15.87 (also displayed against a price of $22.95) would be missed. 
Supreme Ambitions: A Novel, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Supreme 
-Ambitions-David-Lat/dp/1627220461 (as of Dec. 27, 2014). See Compeau et 
al., supra note 9, at 291. 
 361. See Manjoo, supra note 28.  
 362. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
 363. In a 2011 snapshot, factory-outlet apparel sales grew at 17.9%, while 
total industry apparel sales grew at just over 1%. Consumers Shopping for 
Value Propel Growth Trends, NPD GRP. (July 12, 2011), https://www.npd 
.com/wps/portal/npd/us/news/press-releases/pr_110712. Evidence shows that 
this channel strategy has proven successful. See Yi Qian et al., Multichannel 
Spillovers from a Factory Store (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Pa-
per No. 19176, 2013) (introduction of a factory store channel tends to boost 
sales across a retailer’s channels). 
 364. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
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enforcement. 
C. POTENTIAL ENFORCEMENT ZONES 
Fictitious-pricing enforcement should be reintroduced 
gradually and with an eye toward empirical measurement of 
impact on pricing and advertising. Evaluating the impact of the 
actions taken against Michaels Stores and JABC by New York 
State Attorney General would provide a starting point, for ex-
ample, to measure whether the targets complied, how their 
competition reacted, and how pricing and competition changed 
in comparison to nearby states. Beyond that, certain zones may 
be ripe candidates for investigating fictitious pricing practices 
and follow-up enforcement, if required. This Article does not of-
fer an exclusive list of zones for enforcement, nor venues within 
each zone. However, recognizing the FTC’s cost-benefit ap-
proach, this Article offers ideas for where the FTC (or state at-
torneys general) might begin enforcement experimentation. 
1. Strong Brands, Credible Discount Channels 
Where brands have strong quality credibility, and the sell-
ing channel has strong “discount” credibility, consumers may 
be more prone to expect that they will receive items of high 
quality while receiving believable advertised discounts. The 
discounts come with an implicit narrative explaining their ex-
istence. Retail discount outlets, for example, offer consumers an 
implied representation that their stores sell brand items that 
may have been overstocked or moved from flagship stores, or 
that the item is offered at a lower price than the flagship store. 
With outlet-mall pricing, Senator Blumenthal may have select-
ed the right place to plant a pulpit for advocating renewed fed-
eral enforcement of fictitious pricing.365  
An investigation into the pricing practice of retailers who 
use this fast-growing format might reinforce pricing integrity.366 
Non-outlet retailers offering genuine discounts may recover 
share if consumers pause before using the “outlet model / over-
stock” representation as a search characteristic and then in-
store pricing as a compounded search characteristic in that 
 
 365. Senator Blumenthal expressed concern that when forming the dis-
count offers, outlet items were not being matched to similar quality items at 
the flagship stores. Hladky, supra note 2. He references a form of deceptive 
reference point pricing somewhat different from fictitious pricing. 
 366. This Article concedes that an investigation might clear these retailers 
of fictitious pricing practices, which would serve a public purpose of building 
confidence in an “honest” channel. 
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context. Outlet stores, as noted previously, are a fast growing 
brick-and-mortar channel, and intervention might make it 
more likely for consumer searches to stop at the “best offer-
ing.”367 Experimental enforcement in this zone would be war-
ranted.  
2. Discount-Promotion Zones 
Retailers that rely upon discount pricing as part of their 
brand are also prime candidates for investigation. A retailer 
that constantly promotes discounts tries to lure buyers to its of-
ferings—and the advertised discounts may stunt the search, 
especially if the location is physical. The Overstock.com case of-
fered an example of a retailer expressly marketing as a dis-
counter online. Retailers that offer, either expressly or implicit-
ly, that they “compare prices so [the consumer] don’t have to”368 
should be subject to scrutiny because they are explicitly en-
couraging consumers to end the search. Perhaps retailers that 
promote that they will “match or beat any price” are also trying 
to stunt the search, with the implication that the retailer prob-
ably already has the lowest price—or one close enough not to 
warrant continued consumer search. These representations or 
practices may not necessarily mislead, but that these retailers 
are relying heavily on pricing representations warrants scruti-
ny. Again, this Article suggests regulatory investigation, and if 
there is subsequent enforcement, measurement of the regulato-
ry impact to see if enforcement has a net social benefit. 
In sum, an approach similar to the one reached by the 
Overstock.com court should be applied to situations that fall in 
these categories. Injunctive relief would be paramount for pro-
tecting consumers, and penalties would deter. Because individ-
ual harm is difficult to conceptualize, it need not be recovered—
the broader social harm should be remediated and prevented. 
Such actions should only be pursued if the costs prove to out-
weigh benefits, but such a determination has not been made 
since enforcement ceased in 1969. 
  CONCLUSION   
Today’s retail environment vastly differs from the one that 
regulators faced in 1969, when the FTC demoted fictitious-
pricing enforcement as an agenda priority to a non-concern. In 
 
 367. See supra Part IV.B.3.  
 368. People v. Overstock.com, Inc., No. RG10-546833, 2014 WL 657516, at 
*3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2014) (citation omitted).  
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1969, the core works undergirding behavioral economics had 
not yet been written, though circumstantial evidence indicates 
that marketers believed that discounts and fictitious discounts 
induced sales. Today, regulators have the benefit of dozens of 
detailed studies into the welfare impact of fictitious pricing. 
The current marketplace immerses consumers in a competitive 
retail environment with an entirely new class of retailers and 
omnipresent discounting. 
Given the accumulated knowledge since 1969 about the 
power of discounting in influencing consumer behavior—and 
the established consensus that fictitious prior-reference pricing 
diminishes welfare—it is time to revisit regulatory acquies-
cence to what has become a commercial tradition. Federal regu-
lators should reexamine enforcement of fictitious pricing. If 
welfare is enhanced as a product of early enforcement forays, 
then the FTC should judiciously accelerate enforcement at least 
until welfare returns diminish. 
 
